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Geoffrey A. Hoffman* Critique, Culture and Commitment:
The Dangerous and Counterproductive
Paths of International Legal Discourse
In this article, international law is viewed as a social and self-constituting
phenomenon As the product of international society's actualization, it contains
many biases and prejudices. Given the inherent subjectivity of any system
designed to regulate relations between people - and peoples - it is of utmost
importance to subject international law to a searching scrutiny of its tendencies
to emphasise certain interests, to exalt particular groups and to order society in
preconceived ways. This article uncovers the insidious structural biases of
international law including those just beneath the surface as well as those that
are firmly embedded within the consciousness of the discipline's conception. It
proceeds to consider the structural discourses of contemporary international law
that revolve around the fundamental concepts of sovereignty jurisdiction and
state responsibility Additionally. the sovereignty discussion distinguishes between
three categories of bias: (1) biases remaining as remnants of nineteenth century
discourses; (2) biases inhabiting the major metaphors of international law,
especially as illuminated by feminism's critique of the state and state power; and
(3) biases surrounding major substantive areas of international law, such as
protection of the environment and the Kyoto Protocol. The article concludes with
an exploration of fairness discourse In an attempt to reign in bias, and thereby to
resolve the paradox of universalism and the difficulties it has created for
international law and society
Dans cet article, I'auteur consid6re le droit international en tant que phdnomene
social et autoportant. En tant que produit de Iactualisation de la soci6t6
internationale, il abrite de nombreux blais et prejug6s Etant donne la subjectivite
inherente de tout syst6me congu pour reglementer les relations entre personnes
- et entre peuples - il est extr6mement important que le droit international soit
soumis a un examen exhaustif de ses tendances a mettre en evidence certains
int6r6ts, 6 favoriser des groupes particuliers et J ordonnancer la socidt6 de
mani6re pr6conque. Lauteur met en lumi6re les biais structuraux insidieux du
droit international - tant ceux qui affleurent Ia surface que ceux qui sont enfouis
au plus profond de la conscience de la conception de cette discipline. II se
tourne ensuite vers les discours structuraux du drolt international contemporain
qui tournent autour des concepts fondamentaux de la souverainet6, de Ia
competence et de la responsabilite des Etats En outre, la discussion de la
souverainete ddfinit trois categories de prejug6s: (1) les pr6jug6s qui subsistent
du discours du dix-neuvi6me si6cle (2) ceux qui ont donne naissance aux grandes
metaphores du droit international, particuli6rement tels qu'ils apparaissent a la
lumi6re de la critique de IEtat et du pouvoir de l'Etat par le fdminisme, et (3) les
pr6jugds qui entourent les grands domaines substantifs du droit international,
par exemple la protection de I'environnement et le Protocole de Kyoto. Lauteur
conclut en examinant le discours sur 16quit6 dans une tentative de surmonter les
prejuges et, par consequent, de r6soudre le paradoxe de luniversalisme et les
probl6mes qu'il a cre6s pour le droit international et pour Ia soci6t6.
Mr. Hoffman practices immigration and asylum law as an attorney with Kurzban, Kurzban,
Weinger and Tetzeli, P.A. in Miami, Florida. He thanks the following individuals for their tremen-
dous support and encouragement: David Kennedy, Catherine Hancock, and Ira Kurzban.
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Intro dtc'tion
I. Bias in the Conceptual Discourses about International Law
1. Sovereignty
a. Bias in the Extant Concepts of Nineteenth Century
International Law: The Civilized/Uncivilized Distinction
b. Bias in the Metaphors of Contemporarv International Law:
Feminism and New Conceptions of State Sovereignty
c. Bias in Substantive Areas of International Law: The Kyoto
Protocol and the Environment
2. Jurisdiction
3. State ResponsibilitY
II. Evamining the Structure of Fairness Discourse and its Presuppositions
Theory is a/wa for someone and for some purpose All theories have a
perspective. Perspecti cs dcerict' li rin a position in time and space,
specilically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a
standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or
sehoelrimttion, of risin,g and declining pot e: (i a sense of immobilit' or
of prescnt c rtsis, of past experienc, and o/ hopes and expectationsfor the
fiture.... There is, acco rdingly no such thing as theory in itself divorced
rom a standpoint in time and space. When an
" 
theory so represents itself
it is the mcr important to e.avninc it as ideology, and to lay bare its
concealed pcr)ccti'c.'
[H]ave we a right to assomc the survival of something that was originall
thee, alongside ol what was later derived from it? Undoubtedly. There
is nothing strange in such a phenomenon, whether in the mentalfield or
elsewhere. In the animal kingdom we hold to the view that the most highly
dcvelopt'd species we have proceeded from the lowest: and vet we find all
the simple forms still in existence today.2
Nothing we do can be defended absolute/v and finally. But only by
reference to something else that is not questioned.3
1. Robert %\ Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory"
in Robert Kcohane, ed., \eorealism and Its Cri s (Ne\, " ork: Columbia Unix ersity Press, 1986),
quoted in Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J Walker, "Reading Dissidence/N\ riting the Discipline: Crisis
and the Question f Sox creignty in International Legal Studies" (1990) 34 Int'l Studies Q. 367 at 369.
2 . Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents. ed. and trans. by James Strachey (New York:
%V W \orton, I 1ti I ), cited in Antons Anghie, "Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism
in Nineteenth-Century International Law" ( 1999) 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. I at 77.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and ljluc, ed. by G.H. Von Wright. trans. by P. Winch (Oxford:
Blacksscll, 11)80) at 16e.
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Introiduction
International law has undergone protbund and radical transformations. The
history of international law is replete wvith paradigm shifts as momentous
as those in the history of science, philosophy or the arts. The first great
paradigm \\as forged out of the Treat\ of Westphalia in 1648, that point in
histor\ commonly given for the ,enesis of modern international law. Out
of the Treaty. certain metaphors for the state and inter-state relations
became well entrenched and per\asi\e. They concerned the equality of
sovereign and independent nations and rules of action designed to prevent
conflicts and \wars. The next great shift in\ol cd the move away from natural
law to positivism, which gained strength in the late eighteenth century and
culminated in the efforts of the ireat codifiers of the late nineteenth and
earl\ twentieth centuries, those who were determined to set down the rules
of international law in a coherent and systematic manner. Howvexcr. this
quasi-scientific approach \xas deemed a failure. Alejandro Alvarez recog-
nized in the 192()s that a new international la\\ was needed to deal with the
issues of globalization, to better describe the intertwined nature of law and
politics. This realization resulted in a move axxa\ from positivism toward
postmodernit\. from the strict notions of a rules-based system, to a new
conception of international la,. as an ideology, a social system, a great
conversation in which all nations, and ultimately all individuals, groups,
corporate entities and NGOs potentially can participate and realize a new
international societ. 4
The important point for purposes of this article is that with each of
these historical shifts, the prior understandings and conceptual assump-
tions were not eradicated or wholly replaced. While modified and
transmuted by the ne\% innovations, each prior understanding remained
intact as part of the structure upon which the succeeding layer was
constructed. Contemporary international law. as this article seeks to show.
is an amalgam of its history. International lawx exists in a \ery special and
interesting conceptual space. It is simultaneously both postmodem and
antiquated, aspirational and antiquarian, tbrxxard-looking and backward-
referencing. International legal arguments routinely rely on old precedents
4 This histoncal process of change ha, been ,,ell-documented and c\tcni',ely anal,.Ned. See
especially, David Kennedy, "Primitivc Legal Scholarship,'" H )96) 27 Harvard Int'l L.J.; David
Kennedy. "International l-av, and the Nineteenth Century: hiiir\ of an Illusion" (I5 )(,) 65 Nordic
J. Int'l L. 385 (1996). and Anthony Carty, The Decay' of International Law ' 4 Reappraisal of the
Limits of Legal Imagination and International thlairs (Manchester: Manchceier University Press,
1986i) Leo Gross, "The Peace ofWestphalia, 164- 194Y'" ( i94X) 42 AJ 1.1 see also Lori F Damrosch
et al., International Law" Cases and lfatcriuls, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn." k\ c. Group, 2001 ) at xxvii-
XXX% I
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encapsulating bright-line legal rules, such as in The Lotus Case, where
territoriality trumped nationality. At the same time, they also look forward
to customary and so called "soft" las relying on emerging trends in sup-
port of a so called "graduated normativ ity," where there can be various
degrees of more binding and less binding norms. As exemplified in The
\'uclcclr Wapons Case,' the International Court of Justice recognized that
the intemational community is moving toward a prohibition of nuclear
weapons, but that a bright-line rule representing an all-out ban under any
conditions had not vet been realized. The simultaneous referencing of past
legal principles and the importance of emerging trends as having a degree
of normative force greatly complicates matters. It makes the discerning of
bias more difficult as, arguably, historical distance can never really be
achiex ed.
This article aims to identify., catalogue and explore the biases and
blindspots, prejudices and unintended consequences which reside in and
around present day international law. Philip Allott has described the new
intemational law as a social phenomenon, as a self-constituting phenom-
enon, a process whereby the international society is coming to know itself
and is actualized.' For Allott, international law is a social-psychological
phenomenon, and lax and society exist out of(as well as in) the minds of
its constituents.' The basic hypothesis of this article is that because of the
inherent subjectiv ity of any system designed to regulate and mediate
relations between people and peoples it is of the utmost importance to
subject the news international lawx to a searching scrutiny and to ask hard
questions about its tendencies to emphasize certain interests, to exalt
particular groups, and to order society in predetermined or preconceived
ways. The outcomes and distributional consequences of the various deci-
sions, models, and discourses the ways of framing, conceptualizing, and
talking about international law - must be examined.
The biases of the past are easier to perceive than the biases of the present
and the future. One example, the use of the term "civilized states" (which
is still in existence in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice)" and the language employed by the jurists of the nineteenth
5. The Cawc of the SS. "Lotis " (France v Turkeov (1927). P.C. I1 (Scr A) No. 10.
6 Legalit' of the Threat or Use of'Niular )H'al,,mi Case. Advisory Opinion [1996] I.C.J. 226.
7. See Philip Allott, "The Concept ofinternational LaN\" in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law
in International Politics : Essavs in International Relations and International Lai (Oxford Univer-
,ity Press, 2000) at 69.
8 . Ihid. at para 4
9. See Statute of the International Court ofJusticc, 26 June 11)45, U.S.T. No. 993, Art. 38(1 )(c)
[ICJ Statute].
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century readily reveal their prejudices, prejudgments and attitudes. 0 But
the prejudices of the contemporary discourses arc not so easy to discern.
Under normal conditions, xwe are too close in time and perspective during
our c\ err'day legal activities to be able to perceive the new international
la\\'s biases and unintended consequences. It takes a lot of thought and
consideration a lot of patient self-criticism and self-appraisal to be able to
take a step (or more) back and re-evaluate the process and enterprise of
international law making in this new era.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that bias is not a mono-
lithic entity. It does not merely exist in the culture of law. Although
culture does play a part in the discussion which follows, it is only one lens
through which to view bias in international la\\. Many biases exist so deeply
entrenched in the system of international law as to be part and parcel of its
functioning, exhibited in so called background rules and their assump-
tions. Bias is also found in the major procedural doctrines of international
law, in the conceptions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, state responsibility,
nationality, statehood, self-determination, and standing. These structural
features, which dictate the procedural apparatus of international law,
constitute the main subject of this study. Outside the immediate scope of
this article, but equally important. are the more well recognized and well
documented biases in the context of international law's substantive
regimes, for example, in human rights, the environment, or rules surround-
ing a particular nation's labour practices, trade, or immigration policies."'
Before moving to specific examples of bias, there must be an explora-
tion of what is meant by the term itself and whether it can be employed in
a cogent way. To put the matter succinctly, is there a bias in talking about
bias? In some perhaps trivial sense all discourse (all thinking for that
matter) is biased in favour of one group, party, person, or identity and
usually but not necessarily towards the speaker, the client, or the special
interest being represented. But there is a larger concern about bias which
may be derived from reading Roland Barthes' Eiffel Tower essay. 2 Like
Barthes' inhabitant of Paris ascending the Eiffel Tower, international
lawyers and academics exist within the structural constraints and presup-
positions of the international legal regime. Once the sightseer attains the
summit and looks down from the tower's apex there is a transformation of
the city landscape. The city of Paris is seen in a particular way, an idiosyn-
10. See discussion infra, Part I1.
1I. See David Kennedy, "The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?" (2001)
14 Harv. Hum. Rts. Rev. 99 (originally published in (2001) 3 Eur. H.R.L. Rev.).
12. Roland Barthes, A Barthes Reader (Noonday Press, 1983) at 236.
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cratic \ ic\\ ing, mediated by the viewer's position within the tower, its
height, location and, most importantly, by the experience of the viewer as
a person "inside" the tower's structure.
In much the same way, the international lawyer is conditioned to see
the "territory" of international la%% in predctennined and idiosyncratic ways.
As Barthes comments, the xiewer upon looking out over the city land-
scape expects to see certain landmarks, anticipates seeing the historical
Paris, populated with various indicators and remembrances of the city's
past. \Vhen for some reason the landmarks are not present, invisible,
obscured, or otherwise not apparent. the mind of the \iewer necessarily
fills in the gaps created by the lacunae of his or her experience. This is an
automatic and subconscious process, by which our experience is made
whole bN the insertion of our fantasies. Our fantasy of the perceived Paris
is made to match the reality of the expected Paris, that is the preexisting
Paris residing like a spectre of normalcy beneath the curtain of our
conscious minds.
Through the thought experiment of Barthes \e can see the manifesta-
tion of non-tri\ ial bias. Such bias is usually unseen and unappreciated by
the speaker and so causes difficulties, to the point that international legal
discourse can become dangerous and counterproductive. Actors within the
international community, within the matrix of international law, can
confront their prejudices which exist for them outside the tower, but are
pre\ ented from confronting those prejudices which exist a priori as part
and parcel of the to\er's structure. The perception of "outside" bias is
sometimes achieved, as mentioned abo\ e. when there is temporal distance
between the usage of the rule and its formation. When enough time has
passed and society has changed, it becomes easier to recognize the biases
inherent in, for example, the international legal rules supporting colonial-
ism, slavery or the slave trade. The orthodoxies of preceding generations
may become the heresies of their successors.1 Bias can also be discerned
more readily when there is a plurality of \ oices clamouring for attention.
There is. perhaps, a better chance of uncovering biases and blindspots when
a variety of alternative narrators are competing to tell the story of interna-
tional law , as opposed to a narrow range of "official" stories which are
received without questioning and perceived as authoritati\ e. In this sense,
13. Of course this process also occurs in the domestic and not just the intermational realm. Take,
for example, all the instances in o\hich the U S Supreme Court has decided to rcxerse prior cases
and suspend the doctrine of itu'c , t isis. For example, consider the recent case in the context of
state ,odomy laws. Lawrence v Texa., 123 S.Ct 2472 (2003). reversing Boi'ers v Hardwick, 478
t Is IX6 19861
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the chances of achiex ing, a more unbiased, just and fair conception of
international law has arguably been increased in modern times. As inter-
national law changes from a monolithic, top-down, rules-based model to a
more circular, bottom-up, sociological conception, international law
becomes more porous and transparent. Indeed it is more amenable to change
as more voices are raised and more perspectives are integrated into the
web of inter-connecting relationships. 4
The modern mode of operation of international law, because of its rela-
tive lack of top-down vertical structure and of the lesser emphasis it places
on black and white clarity in its rules, is much more dependent for its
legitimation upon its own rhetoric than domestic law. What jurists,
commentators, academics, and international actors say about the doctrines
of international la\\ are more constitutive of international law than what
they say about, for example, a particular nation's contract law or property
law. Talking as ifthere is an emerging world state, as ifthere is a particular
international legal rule, is much more important to the formation of the
reality of the world state and the rule than talking about the existence of
adverse possession in domestic property laxw, for instance. The strong
vertical hierarchy of most domestic legal systems is able to do the work of
legitimation and authoritarian reinforcement which international law
arguably lacks.
International law makes up for the deficiency of ,rerticality by its height-
ened reliance on a conversational, horizontal structure, a wait-and-see
attitude which is largely foreign to the domestic realm. Precisely because
of the inherent importance of international legal discourse one must be
especially vigilant about how one talks about international law, interna-
tional relations, and international legal theory. The discourse of interna-
tional law is a moral force in and of itself. It propagates stereotypes and
creates power relationships. It sneaks up on us because it is so essential to
the process of international law creation.
International law is not made in a vacuum. It has a practical,
pragmatic, real-world nature. Like domestic law, it is made by a feedback
mechanism. International law is, as Allott has written, the world commu-
nity becoming conscious of itself, waking up and looking around, putting
out big and small fires, and generally trying to coordinate and harmonize
the multifarious relationships which arise in our current stage of global-
ization. The nature of the legal rules must be seen in connection with the
14. It could also be argued, conversely, that a plurality of voices instead creates cacophony and
confusion.
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real-\\orld state of affairs against the backdrop of the circumstance that
force adjudicators and treaty partners to create the rules in the first place.
Recently many authors ha\ e noted the relevance of international relations
to international law and are working to bridge the gap between these two
fields.' Howecr, this close connection between "the world" and interna-
tional law is yet another place where bias is especially likely to creep in.
The danger of such real world bias is manifest by the all too easy way
facts may seem to be objective, settled, and are all too often taken for
granted as true. Despite the seeming concreteness of the reported facts, the
so called facts in any particular case are always someone's social
construction and most often the social construction of the most powerful
players in the \world arena. This observation is not the same as asserting
the facts are in dispute, which they often are. Rather, the range of possible
explanations for events - the facts as conceived by all the players to a
dispute - may be imposed by the power elite, whose control often goes
unnoticed and unchallenged. Events happen in the world they are not
percei ed as having happened without linguistic and conceptual tools to
explain through discourse what has happened, why it has happened, and
\\hat remedies, if any, exist to try to ameliorate the harm caused.
Bias also seeps in and surrounds international law by its very attempt
to be a postmodern institution and acti\ ity. This point is elucidated by
Nathaniel Berman in his article, "Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric
of Reconstruction," concerning the relationship between international law
and modem art."6 In this article, Berman draws a parallel between four
aspects of modernism, as he sees them, and then maps these aspects onto
the contemporary conception of international law. For Berman, modern-
ism, as seen through the lens of modern art, embraces the following
characteristics: (I) the critique of representation; (2) an openness to so
called "primitive" sources of cultural energy; (3) innovative experimenta-
tion; and (4) the juxtaposition in a single work of elements previously
considered irreconcilable. These four characteristics also inform our
understanding of the new international lax, that is after the two world
wars, when international law fashioned itself as a way of appeasing
nationalistic energies and harmonizing competing and discordant voices
within the world. The new international law has the following four char-
acteristics, reminiscent of modem art: ( 1 ) the critique of sovereignty as the
15. See Anne-Marie Slaughter. "International L aA in a World of Liberal States" (1995) 6 E.IlL.
503.
16. Nathaniel Berman, "Modernism, Nationalism and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction" (1992) 4
Yale J. L. & Human. 351.
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object wxhich defines international law, (2) an openness to previously
repressed forces of nationalism: (3) the unprecedented invention of a wide
varietv of techniques understood as "legal"; and (4) the juxtaposition in
international legal discourse, doctrines and institutions of elements incom-
patible under traditional legal criteria.
This insight of Berman's highlights a further way in which the new
international law (and for that matter modernism itself) reinforces bias
under the guise of a more reactive, calibrated, and sensitive international
legal structure. For example, the notion under the new conception of inter-
national lawx of primitix ism. x iewed in the new vocabulary as nationalism,
is especially pregnant N\ ith meaning. This notion sets up an implicit
dichotomy between the modem and the primitive and at the same time
tries to contain, mediate and deconstruct the primitive to provide an outlet
for nationalistic feelings and aggressions. This is bias built into modernity
even as it defines itself by reference to the primitive, and the irrational.
As a final consideration in this introduction to the concept of bias in
international law, the practical importance of this exploration must be
emphasized. As Charles Ta lor has noted, groups, like individuals, manu-
facture their identities and sustain their self-worth and self-conceptions
largely on the basis of others' recognition or absence of recognition."7 Thus
uncovering bias is fundamental to allowing groups to fully develop and
evolve. Their development is not dependent merely on their own actions
and perceptions alone, but, as the traditional jurisprudence of interna-
tional laxx teaches, it is also influenced by the perceptions of the interna-
tional community as a whole, in particular how idix idual states are viewed
by other states, governments and courts. A people's, government's, or
social minority's search for recognition may be described as a mirror
created and maintained by the international community upon which the
group can viexw their own identity and their own reality. With this insight,
it becomes apparent that a people's conception of itself is especially
susceptible to bias. As Taylor says, a colonized people's "own self-
deprecation ... becomes one of the most potent instruments of their own
oppression." 9
Bias, prejudice, and blindspots have unintended consequences and
inflict costs on both the development of international law and human life
and well being. They impact the plight of the injured and the oppressed;
17. See Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in Amy Gutmann, ed., Examining the Poli-
tics of Recognition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994) at 25.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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they form hidden impediments which obscure pain, injustice, and oppres-
sion. In some cases, they may even directly be the cause of pain, injustice,
and oppression. -2" It is the aim of this article to uncover the more insidious
structural biases of international law, both those which exist just beneath
the surface as well as those wvhich are embedded within the subterranean
consciousness of the discipline.
The article proceeds in Part I with a discussion of three major struc-
tural discourses of contemporary international law: those revolving around
sovereignty, jurisdiction and state responsibility. Within the sovereignty
discussion, three categories of bias are distinguished: ( 1 ) biases emanating
from the concepts which remain as remnants of nineteenth century and
earlier discourses- (2) biases surrounding the major metaphors of interna-
tional la%. specifically those illuminated by feminism's critique of the state
and state po\wcr; and (3) biases iMN ol\ ed in the major substantive areas of
international la\, in particular the environment and the Kyoto Protocol.
Part II contains a discussion of "fairness" discourse, in an attempt to
define and reign in the concept of bias, and thereby to resolve the paradox
of universalism along with the conundrum this paradox has created for
international law and society.
1. Bias in the Conctptual Discourses about International Law
1. Sovereignrv
The first topic of international legal discourse to be considered is the most
basic and fundamental idea of sovereignty, since it serves to ground and
delimit the state, the actor traditionally considered at the centre of interna-
tional legal relations. It is not difficult to see many of the actual and poten-
tial biases surrounding the conception of socreignty. Sovereignty has
often functioned to retard or freeze the evolution of international law by
protecting states from paying out claims and ev en from the disapprobation
of the international community despite an emerging international legal rule
or trend which otherwise would have condemned their behaviour. As will
be discussed, it is a concept which has its genesis in mid sixteenth to early
seventeenth century Europe and has undergone a peculiar evolution, but is
still relied on as an implicit ground rule and utilized as an important -
albeit eroding - cloak of state protection.
Stephane Beaulac has explored the origins of the term sovereignty from
2)) Kennedy, supra note I I
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its introduction in the sixteenth century in Jean Bodin's Six Livres de la
Republique.2 ' Beaulac examined the history of the term, pointing out that
it w as originally employed by Bodin and his contemporaries for purposes
of domestic governance.22 Beaulac's analysis is premised on the impor-
tant insight (echoing \Vittgenstein) that language is not merely a thing, but
an activityv which communicates "tremendous social power within the
shared consciousness of humanity."3 Beaulac relies upon Philip Allott to
help explain the importance of understanding the pivotal words which have
shaped international law and society. In Allott's words,
As persons and as societies. we are what we were able to be, and we will
be what we are now able to be. So it is with the history of words. We are
what we have said: we \ III be what \\e are now able to say. l),,rds contain
social histoy, distilled and cr-stallized and embodied and preserved, but
available also as a social lorcc, a cause ofnewi social /lects.24
Bodin, in Six Livres. defined so\ creignty as follows: "Majesty or Sover-
eignty is the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens
and subjects of a Common\\ ealth." 25 Beaulac points out that the French
text identifies txwo characteristics of sovereignty: that is "absolute" and
.1perpetual."2b But the "absolute" or "unlimited" nature of Bodin's "sover-
eignty" was tempered by the ca\ eat that the Prince still is subject to "the
laws of God, of nature, and of nations." -  Bodin more specifically
outlined three limits on supreme power: (1) to honor contracts; (2) to
respect private property; and (3) to consent to taxation." Furthermore,
Bodin wrote that there exists other certain "fundamental laws" which the
Prince must accept, concerning essentially "rules of succession of the throne
and the inalienability of the public domain. 29 Bodin env isioned the power
of the Prince as resting upon a pyramidal structure, and the power of
21. See Sephane Beaulac, "The Social Power of Bodin's 'Sovereignty* and International Law"
(2003) 4 Melbourne J_ Int'l Law I. Beaulac acknowledges that although Bodin did not invent the
term, Bodin is considered the "father" of 'sovereignty' because he provided, "'the first systematic
discussion of the nature' of this powerful word.- Ibid. at 6-7 and note 34
22. Ibid. at 2.
23. Ibid-
24. Ibid. at 9, citing Philip Allot, Eunomia new order for a new world (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1990) (emphasis in original).
25. Ibid. at 11.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. at 13.
28. Ibid. at 14.
29. Ibid. at 15.
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soereignty as that of the "'highest unified power, distinguished from that
of the decent-/alied subordinate pou ,er." 3
As Beaulac explains, Bodin's use of the term sovereignty arose out of
the specific social and historical context of France and the French monar-
clh\ in the late sixteenth century. It was a term designed to support and
maintain the monarchy, and especially "to place the ruler at the apex of a
pyramid of authorit." ' It x\as only subsequently, by Vattel and later by
\\ haton, that the internal sox ereignty of which Bodin wrote was distin-
guished from external so\ crcignty, i.e., the "'independence of one political
societ\. in respect to all other political societies." 32 As Beaulac points out,
the transformation of the term sovcreituntx." from internal to external,
showxs its malleability and rhetorical force as a term that is continually
changing.31
This transmutation of so\ creignt\ from its internal to its external
usage allox'cd states, rulers, and goxernments to project their power
outx ard as \\ell as iM\\ard. It allowed for the propagation and instantiation
of idiosyncratic attitudes and prejudices, ex en in contravention of trends
supported by the majority of states within the international community.
The biased nature of external so\ ereignty k\ as especially apparent in the
context of slaxery and the slaxe trade. An early example of sovereignty's
role in preserving and justifying such trade occurred in The Antelope, a
decision by the United States Supreme Court in 1825.-' In that case, the
Spanish and Portugese consuls filed claims concerning "certain Africans
as the propcrt\ of subjects of their nation, " ' after the ship transporting
them vas brought back to the United States under the command of an
American captain, John Smith. Smith also brought a claim for possession
of the Africans as slaves captured jure belli.36 In adjudicating the various
claims, the Supreme Court x\ent to great pains to emphasize that although
public sentiment xxas against the slave trade, the matter was "unsettled,"
and the Court must not yield to such feeling.' After rexviewing prior cases
the Court concluded that the folloxxing rule was to be applied: "that the
legality of the capture of a xe ssel engaged in the slave trade, depends on
the laxx of the country to which the x essel belongs. If that law gives its
30. Ihid at 19 (emphasis in original).
31. Ibid at 22.
32 Ibid at 27, note I 9s, citing \k hcaton
33 Ibid. at 26-27
34. The Intelop', 23 U.S 06 10 Wheat 66 I X25).
35 Ibid at 67.
36. Ibid at 6,'
37. Ibid. at 114
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sanction to the trade, restitution \% ill be decreed...". "M This rule was
premised on several propositions emanating directly out of the external
sovereignty of states: e.g., "No principle of general law is more univer-
sally acknowledged, than the perfect equallt\ of nations ... Each legislates
for itself, but its legislation can operate ont itself alone." , Consent
becomes required before a nation can be seen to have relinquished a "right"
to engage in the slave-trade. "in Which [historically] all have participated." '
Applying these principles, the Court entered into a calculation based upon
testimony and documentarx evidence as to the precise number of Africans
taken from Spanish ships. Since the number belonging to any Portugese
ships could not be determined, the Court ultimately held that the Africans
be di\ ided between Spain and the United States, "'to be disposed of
according to law."' 4'
The other paradigmatic use of sox ereignty in the nineteenth century
xxas as a tool for state actors to justify expansion of their empires, that is as
a means for legitimating the process of colonization. Antony Anghie "
explained the myriad effects that positivism and notions of soxereignty
had in supporting the colonial encounter. Anghie's main thesis goes
further, however, in asserting that "the problem of order among states is a
problem that has been peculiar ... to the specificities of European history
... the extension and universalization of the European experience... [which]
has the effect of suppressing and Subordinating other histories of interna-
tional law and the people to whom it has applied." ' For Anghie, his inter-
est lies "not only in the important point that positivism legitimized
conquest and dispossession. but also in the reverse relationship - in iden-
tiP\,ing how notions of postix ism and sovereignty were themselves shaped
by the encounter."'
Features of nineteenth centur-, and earlier thought, including the sharp
distinction between civilized and uncivilized states, still reverberate
today.4 Anghie sums up his argument by stating "that central elements of
38. Ibid. at 11i .
39 Ibid. at 122.
40. Ibid.
41 Ibid at 133.
42 Antony Anghie, "'Finding the Periphenes: So% ereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century
International Law" (1999) 40 Hat'. J. Int'l L. I.
43. Ibid. at 7.
44. Ibid. at 6.
45 Anghie cites Wheaton for standing behind the proposition that what counts as law is the cus-
tom "which is practiced only among 'cis lized countries."' tlhtd at 23 tin 1866, Wheaton wrote:
"is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the nations and states
of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always been, and still is, limited to the
civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin." Ibid., quoting Hcnry
Wheaton, Elements of International Law ed. by George Grafton Wilson (The Carnegie Institute of
Washington photo. Reprint 1964) 11866) at 15
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nineteenth-century international law are reproduced in current approaches
to international law and relations."4" This insight is based upon the fact
that the "naturalist notion of a mythic state of nature [was] replaced by a
positivist notion of a mythic age when European states constituted a self-
exident family of nations." ' " Sovereignty became a tool for dividing the
European from the non-European world: "since the non-European world
was not 'sovereign,' virtually no legal restrictions were imposed on the
action of European states \Nith respect to non-European peoples.""4
The concept of sovereignty certainly has ex olved since the days of The
Antelope and its use in furthering the colonial encounter, but it is still
utilized to justify state power and as a means of shielding states from
international disapprobation and sanction. Before World War II, for
example, there was unbounded optimism that the external sovereignty of
individual nations could be mediated by the League of Nations.4" Geoffrey
Butler opined in an article published in the British Year Book of Interna-
tional Law ( 1920-21 ) that sovereignty can be checked by the League but
in a way that prescres fundamental rights. He summed up his point as
follows:
[l]n so far as the League of Nations supplies a mechanism for the
preservation of thcsc rights and xalues, the conception of sovereignty,
with its neccssary implication of moral authorit's. can for the first time be
applied to e\ternal affairs in a more adequate sense than as a mere assertion
of the unchecked power either ofthc states or of some central federation.5°
For Butler, the League represented a \\ay to ensure peace, so that "subcon-
scious" activities of states, e.g., mining, engineering, locomotion,
engineering, and preventative medicine, could be conducted without the
interruption of w\ar. -'
Unfortunately, the League failed in its mission to keep the peace and
the tragedy of World War II resulted. During and after the second world
war, international legal scholars and jurists began to reconceive the notion
of so\ ereigntN and the nature of the state itself. This conceptual transfor-
mation is e\ ident in Hans Kelsen's 1942 work, Law and Peace in Interna-
46. Ihid at 8.
47 Ihid at (,X
4X. Ibid. at 69.
41) Geoffrey Butler, "Smereignty and the League of Nations" ( 1920) I Brit. Y.B. int'l L. 35.
SO, Ibid. at 4 I
S1. Ibid. at 41-44
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tional Relations. Kelsen questioned the Austinian assumption that a state
is so\ereign because "no other order can be conceived to exist above the
state or the legal order of the state such that it can obligate the state or the
individuals representing it." For Kelsen, sovereignty (like the state
itself) does not exist "'in the realm of physical reality," but rather as a
mental construct. "The state is so\ ereign if we conceive it to be sovereign,
if\\e conceive the order of the state to be highest. It is not sovereign if we
proceed from a different assumption." 5' Kelsen speaks of the "dogma of
so\ ereitnty" which functions to support the state, just as '[t]he concept of
the state is a typical product of political theology.""
The principles espoused in 1942 by Kelsen in a theoretical sense were
later articulated and expanded upon in a practical setting by Judge Alejandro
Alvarez in the Corfu Channel Case in 1949. " Alvarez had previously
written about the importance of the "new" international law embracing a
new psychology and ideology, where the artificial division between law
and politics \as not so clearly defined. 5 Alvarez applied his thinking in
practical terms to decide a case between Britain and Albania, which arose
out of an incident that occurred in the Corfu Strait. On October 22, 1946
txo British destroyers struck mines in Albanian waters, causing damage to
the ships and loss of life." In Cmr/iu Channcl, Alvarez had this to say
regarding the evolving concept of sovereignty:
Bv sovereignty, \e understand the \hole body of rights and attributes
which a State possesses in its territory. to the cxclusion of all other States.
and also in its relations with other States .. . Some jurists ha\ c proposed
to abolish the notion of sovereignty of States. considering it obsolete.
This is an error. This notion has its foundations in national sentiment and
in the psychology of peoples, in fact it is deeply rooted.... This notion
has evolved, and \%e must now adopt a conception of it x hich \\ill be in
harmony with the new conditions of social life. We can no longer regard
sovereignty as an absolute individual right of every State, as used to be
done under the old law founded on the individualist regime, according to
which States \x ere bound only by the rules which they had accepted [i.e.,
as in The Antelope, discussed above]. To-day, owing to social
52. Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations (Cambridge, Mass. Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 1942).
53- Ibid. at 78-79.
54. Ibid. at 78.
55. Ibid. at 43-44
56. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom i .llhania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 39 [Corfil].
57. Alejandro Alvarez, "The NeN% International Law" (16 April 1949 Grotius Soc. 35.
58. Corfu, supra note 56.
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interdependence and the predominance of the general interest, the States
are bound ht\ many rules which la~c not been ordered by their will. The
sovereignty of States has no\k become an institution, an internationalsocial
function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised in
accordance \ ith the new international lax\"
Al arez, in his indi\ idual opinion, then proceeded to discuss state respon-
sibility, concluding inter alia that there is a place under international law
for - what he termed the concept of a "misuse" or "abuse" of right.6"
For .\lvare/, states could be held liable even if their actions were under-
taken \\ ithin their sovereign rights.'1
Clearly the concept of soe reignty has undergone a radical change from
the days of The.-Intelopc, \\'heaton, Vattel, and Bodin. No\\ it is time to
determine the biases within modern discourses on sovereignty, and to ex-
plore how prior conceptions of so% ereignt\ still permeate the conceptual
space of international law and its language games today. Before making
this transition, it is w\orth considering the four propositions regarding
discourses on soxcreigniv noted in Reading Disadcnc'e If'riting the
Discipline. Crii.si. and the Question ol Sovereignti
, 
in International Stud-
ie.. These propositions may be rendered in condensed form as follows:
I. ")iscourscs of ',ov ereignt cannot relate to their object, sovereignty
a, other than a problem or question." This statement emanates from the
realization that so\ercigntx enters discourse as a reflection on a lack or
loss. somcthing that might haxc been but is no longer.
2 "The problem of'so\ercignty is profoundly paradoxical." The paradox
is derixed from the dual nature ot sovereignty, as referring to something
that is "a fundamental principle, a supporting structure, a base" but at the
same time dependent on activity that proceeds without foundations, "hence
a foundation beyond doubt."
3. "It follows that texts or discourses that x ould produce a serblance of
a resolution to the problem of soxereignt, must engage in a kind of
duplicity."
4. And, finally, that all "'resolutions' to the problem of so\ereignty
proffered by texts or discourses can only be unstable and tentative. " "
59 (orfu, %upra noc 56. Separate opinion o' Judge .\h .arc/ at 43.
61 Ihid at 41-46
61. Ihid. at 47-48
6 2. Richard K. A,hlcy & R.B.J '\alker, supra note I.
i03. Ibid at 3 1-X3
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It is important to bear in mind the ultimate tentativeness of any discourse
in\ol\ ing so\ereignty. .As the authors of Reading Dissidence conclude,
"the word [sovereignty] can but connote a boundless region of ambiguous
acti\ itv that a vagabond desire ...\\ ould mark off, fill, and claim as a terri-
torv of its o\\n"i- In so\ ercinity's ambiguity lies its ambition, as well as
its effectiveness as a strategic tool for those who use it to preserve the
status quo and their po\\er.
The tbllo\x ing discussion invol\ es three groupings of bias surrounding
the notion of sovereignty in international la\\. The groups may be labeled
as follows: ( I ) remnants of bias in the still extant concepts of nineteenth
century and earlier international la\\. (2) bias existing in the prevailing
metaphors of contemporary international law: and (3) bias in the use of
sovcreignty in the major substantive areas of international law. The chart
belo\ summarizes these three groupings:
Three Groupings of Bias Surrounding the Concept of Sovereignty
Concepts Metaphors Substance
examples: "ci ihzed cxamples: gendered examples human rights.
nations": terra nullius; notion, of the state: the environment, trade




Focus will be placed on a representative sample of bias from each group.
They are: within the "concepts" category, the civilized/uncivilized distinc-
tion; within the "metaphors" category, feminism and new conceptions of
state sovereignty, and within the "substance" category, the environment,
specifically, the Kyoto Protocol.
a. Bias in the Extant Concepts of Nmneteenth CenturY International Law:
The Civilized/Uncivilized Distinction
An important remnant of the nineteenth century concept of sovereignty,
which directly shapes and influences contemporary international law
discourse, is the civilized/uncivilized dichotomy." A glaring example may
64. Ibid. at 383.
65. Ibid.
66. Anghie, supra note 42 at 23.
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be found in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(I'.1), used uni\ ersally today as the main mode of determining appropriate
sources of international law."7 Article 38, subsection 1(c), provides: "The
Court, \\hose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c) the general
principles of law recognized by ci\ilized nations ...."" This use of"civi-
lized" in the most foundational document of modem international law is a
clear indication that some nations, i.e., those deemed uncivilized, will be
excluded from the discourse of international la\x.
More than that, the cixtilizeduncivilized dichotomy, as Anghie has
written, represented a technology of control over non-European states.69
It presented "non-European societies \ ith the fundamental contradiction
of ha\ ing to comply \\ ith authoritati\ c European standards in order to win
recognition and assert themselkes. " ' " So\ ereignty for the non-European
nations was "'a profoundly ambiguous development, as it involved alien-
ation rather than empowerment, and presupposed the submission to alien
standards rather than affirmation of authentic identity."- Anghie makes
the point that this dichotomy and its racial overtones became "something
of an embarrassment" for the nex\ international law which has tried in
large part to expunge this language from its discourse. "
\Vhile the language inaN haxe been largely expunged - with the
explicit exception of Article 38 - the concept still remains with us in
insidious and thinly veiled ways. An example is the new liberalism, epito-
mized by the work of Anne Marie Slaughter. Slaughter utilizes interna-
tional relations theory and applies it to fashion a new international law
based on the distinction between liberal and non-liberal states." In her
article, "International Lawx in a World of Liberal States," she outlines her
project, "consistent with an o\erall commitment to a new generation of
interdisciplinary scholarship, is to reimagine international law based on an
acceptance [of the distinction between liberal and non-liberal states] and
an extrapolation of its potential implications." ' At the outset, it should be
mentioned, Slaughter openly acknow ledges the potential "distastefulness"
67 See ihid at 75, n. 267.
68. ICI Statute, Art. 38( 1 )(c), i ipra note 9.
69. \nghic, supia note 42 at 72, n. 257.
70, Ihid at 73.
71, Ibid at 73.
72. Ibid at 74-7s.
73. Slaughter. supra note 15.
74 Ibid. at 5O5
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of this enterprise with the following cax cat:
The xery idea of a division betx een liberal and non-liberal States may
prove distasteful to many. It is likel\ to recall 19" century distinctions
between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' States, rc\ rapped in the rhetoric of
Western political values and institutions. Such distinctions summon images
of an exclusik e club created b, the poxx erful to justify their dominion
over the weak. Whether a liberal non-liberal distinction is used or abused
for similar purposes depends on the normative svstern developed to govern
a world of liberal and non-liberal Statc .Exclusioniarv norms are unlikehi
to h CIt/ctic in t' gulating that ii orld. (emphasis added).
For Slaughter. the dix ision between states based on "liberality" is a tool
which can be "used or abused" depending on the "normative system" that
is developed. In a further attempt to distance herself from the ethical im-
plications of her project she self-consciously labels it a "self-professed
'thought-experiment,"' as opposed to a call to action, a proposal for the
future, or some other more ambitious real-\\ orld enterprise.
Slaughter's caveat is ineffective to insulate the project from the
"distasteful" bias of the nineteenth century for at least txwo reasons. First,
there is the implicit assumption that the "normatix e system" de\ eloped to
govern a world of liberal and non-liberal states will shy away from "'exclu-
sionarv norm.." allegedly because such norms would be "unlikely to be
effective in regulating that xorld." However, this assumption is
unwarranted. The "exclusionary norms" of the nineteenth century were
quite "effective" in creating a normative order for the "civilized" xxorld,
and providing a legal context which supported slavery, the slax e trade, and
colonialism. There is no reason to suppose categorically that exclusionary
policies would not be "effective" to order contemporary society just
because the term used to describe preferred states has been changed from
"civilized" to "liberal." Such policies and norms are very often effective
and can be used to create alliances and trading practices which may have
widespread economic advantages while causing deleterious consequences
to so-called "non-liberal" states.
A second reason to call Slaughter's distinction into question concems
the other implicit assumption contained in her caveat: that the "normative
order" can be divorced from the distinctions, language games and analytic
framework used to build that order, as if the normative order is somehow
75. Ibid at 506.
76. Ibid.
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separate and distinct from the conceptual distinctions that it itself uses to
car\C up reality. In fact, the normative order is created out of, and directly
reflects, the language used to represent the state of affairs of contemporary
international reality. Slaughter attempts to wash her hands clean of any
racist connotations or disadvantageous consequences flowing to non-lib-
eral states by supposing that some "normati\e order" will appear like a
deus ex machina to pre\ ent abuses. Such an assumption is ill-conceived,
unrealistic and simplistic. It presupposes a faith in a reified order, which
e\ists somehow outside her "'liberal, non-liberal" construct of reality. Such
an untethered normative order is a fantasy.
Under Slaughter's model, the very notion of sovereignty is radically
redefined. The state is a disaggregated entity. The new sovereignty oper-
ates for the purpose of facilitating the acquisition and retention of power
for the so called liberal states. In the nex\ly conceived world of liberal
states:
* 'the State' is composed of multiple centres of political authority -
legislativ e, administrati e, executix e and judicial;
* each of these institutions operates in dual regulatory and representative
capacity ... defined in terms of a specific set of functions it performs
* the proliferation of transnational economic and social transactions
creates links betxxeen each of these institutions and individuals and
groups in transnational society...
* interactions among counterpart or coordinate institutions from different
States ... are shaped by ... an awareness of a common or complementary
function transcending a particular national identity .
Under the nc\ system, a "negarchy" is created, that is, in Slaughter's own
words, "a liberal political order betxween anarchy and hierarchy in which
power is checked horizontally rather than vertically.' As Slaughter
observes, "the norm of sovereignty would have to be constructed so as to
constitute andprotect political institutions of liberal States in carrying out
their individual functions and in checking and balancing one another." 71
It is not contended that Slaughter's entire project should be dismissed
outright because of the potential bias inherent in her reconception of the
international legal order. To the extent that she points out the many-lay-
ered intricacies of power relationships between and among international
77. Ibid. at 5 34-535.
78 Ibid at 535, n. 67.
79. Ibid. at 535 (empha.i, added).
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actors and political institutions, her project adds important and realistic
sophistication to the model of international community. But a hard look
needs to be taken at Slaughter's assumptions, especially, the primary
empirical and neo-Kantian assertion that liberal states do not make war
with each other or that the world as a whole would be better off with the
imposition of such a stark distinction bct\xcen states based on a character-
ization of their liberal nature. Such an inquiry has already been undertaken
bv Jose Alvarez in a critique of Slaughter's liberal theory, in which he
argues that she relies upon questionable assumptions about how liberal or
democratic states beha\e)"
Alxarez first points out that Slaughter's liberal theory is prescriptive
and not merely descripti\e, it is not mercly a "thought-experiment" as she
characterized it. According to Alvarez, "[t]he liberal theory of international
relations, or 'transgoernmentalism., is ... presented as a 'blueprint for
the international architecture of the 21" century, offering nothing less than
"ans\ ers to the most important challenges tacing advanced industrial coun-
tries."'' Slauuhter's liberal theory, for Alx arez, is "millenist, triumphalist.
upbeat," and he underscores the exceedingly positive reception it has
receix ed among polic\-makers, at least in the United States. "
In contrast to this good reception. Alvarez notes that there haxe been
se\ eral critiques of liberal theory, but most have failed to grapple wxith the
assumptions the theor\ makes about how states actually behaxc.
For example,
Harold Koh has criticized liberal theory for being "essentialist" and for
failing to recognize that nations are not permanently liberal or non-liberal.
Susan Marks has criticized Slaughter's liberal theory as part and parcel of
... "liberal millenarism" [and it,,] uncritical and superficial xew\ of
democrac,. noting that liberal millenarists too readily assume that periodic
elections ensure a genuine political choice or a real free market of ideas.
Harsher critics have emerged from ... "critical" legal scholars, "ne\\
streamers" or scholars of the "sub-altern" or the "post-colonial." For these
critics, liberal theory does more than "shift attention away from the scale,
character, and sources of deprixation, oppression and conflict in the
contemporary world": it is the oppressive voice ofneo-liberal hegemony.'4
80. Jose E. A]\ arez, "Do Liberal States Behave Better" A Critique Slaughter's Liberal Theory"
(2001) 12 E.JA.. 1I10
81. Ibid. at 188.
82. Ibid. at 189-90.
,3 Ibid. at 192.
84. Ibid.
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.\h are/'s critique, however, is more limited and pointed. He asks a central
question behind Slaughter's liberal theory: whether liberal states behave
better than non-liberal states. An inquiry into this question is crucial
because it was just such an unquestioned assumption about the allegedly
self-evident moral superiority of so-called civilized states in the nineteenth
centurv that allo\\cd the creation and support for the regimes of slavery
and colonialism xhich we now abhor. In answer to the question "Do
Liberal States Behave Better?" he concludes that "we don't know for sure
but ... there is plenty of reason to be sceptical."
\lvarez makes clear that his inquiry 'does not take issue with many of
Slaughter's premises," e.g., the ethical attractixeness of democracy, its
importance in fostering cixil and political rights as well as economic
development, and its benefits in quelling violence, especially in the
context of ethnic conflict." ' Alvarc/ instead investigates "what little we
know" about compliance and "whether liberal theory accurately describes
the international lakx making practices of liberal states, whether in the
context of traditional treaties, transnational networks or transjudicial
communication."'- I le also explores inter alia "whether liberal theory and
its prescriptions xwill further peace among nations."" His conclusions, as
he describes them, are "a great deal more equixocal than those reached by
Slaughter" yet "less damning than those reached by her harshest critics." 9
Mention of a couple of Al\arez's arguments may represent his critique.
Alxarez points out that the paradigm of a liberal state, the United States,
"has plainly not taken the route followed by European states with respect
to direct or \ ertical enforcement of human rights conventions." ' Enforce-
ment of international human rights in U.S. courts has been made "notori-
ously difficult" given the reservations and limitations placed upon human
rights agreements by the United States.' Alvarez makes the further point
that contrary to the predictions of the liberal theorists, "the leading
examples of U.S. treaty obligations permitting 'xertical' enforcement by
U.S. domestic courts hax e not been treaties wx ith other liberal nations but
bilateral in\ estment treaties (BITs), mosth with non-liberal nations."' The
example of BITs (and also FCN treaties, i.e. treaties of Friendship,
85 Ihid at I94
s56 Ihid at 1i1
87. Iid
8 Iid
89. lhid at 194
9) Ihid
' I bild
92 lhid at 196 -97 The ist includes: Bangladesh. Cameroon. Egypt. Grenada, Morocco, Senagal,
TurkeN, and Zaire, and l.tcr, Hlaiti, Panama, the ( ongo and Poland.
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Commerce and Navigation) appear to undermine Slaughter's presupposi-
tions about compliance and liberal and non-liberal states' treaty-making
practices.
Alvarez next addresses liberal theorists' assumptions regarding the
general law-abiding nature of liberal regimes, and challenges Slaughter's
claim regarding "transnational netmxorks," namely that "liberal states are
... more likely to establish, maintain and adhere to these networks, and the
'soft' informal obligations that result from them."'13 Alvarez suggests that
perhaps Slaughter's descriptixe reliance on such networks as a basis for a
prescriptive argument is circular. As he says, "[i]t may be true that the
kinds oftransgo\ ernmental contacts that Slaughter describes prevail among
the West's industrialized states ... [but] if one defines the relevant govern-
mental contacts to be those that one finds among the W\est's quasi-autono-
mous gox ernmental institutions, it stands to reason we would find more
such contacts in the West.""' Later. Alvarez attacks Slaughter's description
of how international law norms are nationalized, arguing that the suggested
dichotomy - "traditional lav is coercive and top-down while regulatory
networks are soft and bottom-up" - does not accurately describe either
view of norm making or the complex interplay between the two.""'
Alvarez also calls into question Slaughter's assumptions regarding the
purported connection between liberal theory and peace."' In support of
her assumption. "Slaughter says nothing about the many debates about
which wars or how many casualties ought to 'count,' [or] about arguments
that the thesis of a liberal peace may only be viable for the relatively short
post-1945 period ...... Al-xarez is especially critical of the liberal theo-
rists' failure to provide a convincing rationale for liberal peace. Slaughter's
explanation of attitudes shared by liberal states "point in all directions at
once" and does not provide a basis, according to Alvarez, for prescriptive
claims. 1 As Ido Oren has wvritten, and is cited by Alvarez, liberal peace is
"not about democracies per se as much as it is about countries that are
perceived to be 'of our kind."'" If Oren is correct, it leaves room for the
possibility that "liberal states may have a tendency, perhaps a greater
tendency than non-liberal states, to wage war on those that they perceive
93. Ibid. at211.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid. at 213.
96. Ibid. at 234-38.
97. Ibid. at 234-35.
98. Ibid. at 236.
99. Ibid., citing Ido Oren, "The Subjectivity of Liberal Peave" in Debating the Democratic Peace,
ed. by Michael W. Doyle et al. (Cambridge, lass. MIT Press, 1996).
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as non-liberal. " "
The Slaughter-Ahare/ dialogue is a healthy one for the future of inter-
national lax\. The kind ot'critique propounded by Alvarez challenges the
somnabulistic tendency of any adherent acting, judging, or speaking within
a conccptual structure to fall back into the patterns of the past. There is a
real danger, which discourse itself engenders, of allowing thought to be
shaped bN the processes, distinctions and underlying prejudices of prior
discourses. The answer is to be ever x itgilant against the subconscious urges
xxhich encourage rationalization and justification of the current sphere.
The theories of mainstream international law, as quoted at the beginning,
are alw\ays 'for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a per-
spectixe. Perspcctives derive from a position in time and space, specifi-
cally social and political time and space." '°
b. Bias in the kletaphor.N ol Contemporary International Law:
Feminism and New C(onceptions ot State Sovercik,'nrI
The ne\t modern discourse of sovereignty to be considered is an
especially good example of the perspectixal nature of theory, of how
preconceived notions of "the State" can have far-reaching consequences
in terms of state practice and norm creation. Feminist writers have
attacked biased notions of the state: specifically they have criticized the
ayvs in which bias arises in the background conceptions held by interna-
tional laxx\ers, scholars and other international actors. Karen Knop has
pointed out that "international la\\ does not yield easily to feminist legal
methods."'0 2 This is a polite - a perhaps consciously toned down -
understatement of the true state of affairs. A more accurate description of
international law is a discipline \\hich has on occasion "looked the other
xxay," one in \xhich until recently the subjugation of women and other
minorit\ groups have either been ignored, permitted, justified, or condoned
both in times of war and of peace.
Knop begins her analysis by noting the ambivalent notion of sover-
eignty under international la\\. She eloquently describes the nature of
so\ ereignty as "at once brute fact of power and central metaphor of
normatix it\, obstacle to the paradisaical future worlds and means of their
realization, barrier to transparent global relations within individuals and
groups and essential sanctuary for them." ' - These ambivalent, ambigu-
100 hid at 23X
1III (o\, cited in Robert Keohane supra note I at 20i7.
102 Karen Knop, "'Feminiskm and State So\creignty in International m (1993) 3 Transnt'l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 293
103 Ibid at 295.
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ous, and contradictory characteristics of sox crcignty are at once its power
and its poison. Knop's first self-described project is to "increase women's
participation in the process of international law."'" Her second project,
interconnected with the first, is to examine "the implications of feminist
theory for alternative conceptions of sovereignty." '  This article will fo-
cus on the second question, specifically Knop's discussion of how the
"metaphor of the sovereign State as a bounded, unified self returns us to
the problematic equation of State so\ ereignty with individual autonomy.""' 6
Before discussing1 the prevailing metaphor of the state as a "bounded,
unified self," Knop makes an interesting and effectixc move in identifying
those aspects of sovereignty wxhich can be \ iewed as at the "centre," and
those at the "periphery." of international law. Inasmuch as the center-
periphery distinction itself is merely a metaphor for the locus of entrenched
power relations, the distinction functions mainly as a mode of instantiat-
ing and reproducing the structural bias of the system. Knop turns the
center/periphery distinction on its head. hoxvever, xith her insight into a
further dimension to the international cix il society beyond "statism," i.e.,
the notion that states are the central and most important players in the
international arena. For Knop. "international civil society is a creature
both liberated and enslaved by its marginality. Its existence at the edges of
the system of States frees this mix of non-goxernmental organizations,
unofficial groups of experts. and other initiatixes from the narrox\
confines of self-interest ...... _ Knop accepts the center periphery
distinction, but at the same time uses it to catapult herself to a new under-
standing of power in the international community.
Knop's discussion continues by citing other feminist thinkers who also
seek to pass beyond the center periphery dichotomy. Marie Goetz, for
example, "'struggles to eliminate the elements of centre, unity and totality
that organize structures in hierarchical oppositions' and 'allows for the
fact that women experience simultaneously many oppressions and must
engage in a multitude of struggles that conflict and supplement each
other."" 8 Knop calls this trend which operates outside the mainstream
statist system, "dancing in the normative margins. " 109 She notes, however,
104 Ibid. at 296.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid. at 297.
107. Ibid. at 316 (emphasis added).
108. Ibid. at 31 ,. n. 90, quoting Anne Marie Goetz. "Feminism and the Claim to Know: Contradic-
tions in Feminist Approaches to Women in Development- in Rebecca Grant & Kathleen Newland,
eds., Gender in International Relations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991 ) at 133.
109. Ibid. at 316.
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that gender conscious groups have to "contend with the fact that these
margins are defined by the mainstream fora." "' She also directs attention
to further dangers: "the dark side of unregulated intemational civil society
is its tendency to replicate the imbalance of political and economic power
that characterizes the system of States, an imbalance apparent in the rela-
tions between First World and Third World NGOs [for example]."' '
In addition, Knop points out the limitations of making an analogy
between the state, as a "bounded, unified self," and an individual being:
"the analogy cannot take into account that States are not like individuals in
the significant respect that they are not unified beings, they are not
irreducible units of analysis."'2 Knop identifies the bias that flows from
the indi\ idualistic conception of the state k% hen she observes that "the anal-
ogv renders problematic any consideration of the status of individuals and
groups in international law\. other than as part of a monolithic State."" 3
She further argues that some feminist approaches to international law are
coloured by two resulting ie\ wpoints emanating from such analogy: "the
territory of the State as the plhsical body of the individual and the territory
of the State as the individual's private property." ." Her salient point is
that these metaphors arising out of the bias of statism prevent our progress
toward a greater appreciation of the rights of women and peoples within
states.
Knop concludes with an examination of txo "normative approaches"
to sovereignty: "limited sovereignty" and "o\ erlapping sovereignty."' 5 The
concept of limited so\ ereignty takes into account the question "why the
State should have a monopoly on representation in intemational fora when
it ma not [be able to] decide the issue at hand domesticallv," because, for
example, "ethnic minorities are claiming greater autonomy within the
State."'" In contrast, the concept of"overlapping so\ereignty" is at odds
with the "monocular view" of sovereignty, instead embracing "the recog-
nition of overlapping legal orders."'' " An example is the European
Community which coexists with its constituent states, and contains
mediating institutions which at the same time allow for the retention of an
intact, albeit more porous state sovereignty.
110 Ibid
I I. Ibid at 317.
12. Ibid at 120
113. Ibid. at 320.
114 Ibid at 120
115. Ibid at 34I.
116 Ibid. at 341.
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Knop's work should be applauded for utilizing the center/periphery
distinction to highlight \rayrs \\omen can be empowered "by the [relatively]
fluid and unconstricted nature of emerging international civil society" and,
e\en more importantly, for her ability to see the detrimental as well as the
beneficial aspects of working at the margins. Knop also deserves credit for
examining the various conceptions of state powx er as being determined by
pre-existing metaphors. She takes the existing literature concerning new
ways to conceptualize international law\. for example, the policy-oriented
perspective of \lcDougal and Lasswell, the transition toward a new world
order system of Richard Falk. and the functionalism of Julius Stone and
Douglas Johnston. and suggest, wavs feminist thinkers can harness these
ideas to better represent women's and group interests.
c. Bias in Substantive.irea ol International Law: The Kyoto Protocol
and the Environment
This section focuses on the Kvoio Protocol because it has become the situs
of an acrimonious debate over national so\ereignty and the perceived
dangers of a ne\ en\ iro-imperialism. balanced against the asserted neces-
sity for a new international framework to deal \\ ith global and transnational
problems. Couched within the arguments proffered on both sides of the
debate are the remnants of nineteenth century conceptions of sovereignty,
as w\ell as new\ metaphors created to deal with the monumental problems
of contemporary societ\. The Protocol builds on the 1992 "nited Nations
Framework Convention ,m Climate Change'" which \\as designed to set
up a regime to address the problem of global warming by the eventual
lowering of green house gas emissions. 9 In 1997, "more than 160 nations
met in Kyoto, Japan to negotiate binding limitations on greenhouse gases
for the developed nations," who "agreed to limit their greenhouse gas
emissions, relative to the le\els emitted in 1990."'I "The United States
agreed to reduce emissions from 1990 lexels by 7 percent during the
period 2008 to 2012."' - However, the United States subsequently failed
to ratify the Protocol.2 -
The core critique of the Protocol made by staunch traditional state
sovereignty voices employs familiar rhetoric concerning the inviolability
118. UnitedA at,ns FrameworkCom'ention on Climate Change,9 May 1992. U.N. Doc. A AC.237/
18(Part II Add 1; 31 ILM 849 (1992) (entered into force 21 March 1994).
119. Shalini Prakash, "Enforcement of International Enironmental Law: The Kv,, Protocol,"
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of state power, especially the necessity that states be permitted to with-
draw their consent to treaty conditions. 23 In addition, supporters of tradi-
tional so\ereignty decry the Protocol's authority to set energy emissions.
Here is the rhetoric of one such position:
The Protocol does not limit emissions in the developing countries. China
\\ill rapidly surpass America's emissions early in the next century.
(reenhouse gas emissions will not be slowed by the Protocol: they will
simpl\ be shifted fron the northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere.
S Io \ll America's jobs, industr\
, 
and wealth. The first-step Protocol is
designed to start a scries of five-year "'budget periods" for which the
Conference of the Parties is empowered to adiust the emissions limits on
de\ eloped countries l3\ limiting America's emissions, the UN effectively
limits our eneru use. B. embracing this Protocol. America is willingly
gi\ ing up its authority to set its own energy policy. The Gore/Clinton
Administration has embraced the Protocol and has the audacity to claim
that it is not a surrender of national sox ereignty.' :4
Later in the article, the author creates an alarming picture of the dangers of
the Protocol, characterizing it as in\ading "cx ery facet of American life":
The consequences of the KN oto Protocol include another giant step toward
global governance The international bureaucrac, being constructed by
the 1,i\ s reaching its tentacles into e\ cr, facet of American life - hiding
behind the scary scenario of planetary impoverishment. Society is being
trans ormed incrementally to conform to the vision of Al Gore's 1992
declaration that societies must be restructured around the central organizing
principle of protecting the en\ ironment. -"
The above American vie\ has been echoed by other national voices,
including those in other dc\ eloped countries. Here is an example from an
Australian perspective:
\\bh should the Kyoto Protocol, of itself, presage a newx imperialism?
\\ hat distinguishes the Kyvoto Protocol from exer\ other international treaty
v\hich Australia has ratified'? The difference between Kyoto and every
123. See R Bans "The K iw Prom,d: Fast Road to Global Governance" (Address to the Samuel
Griffith Soucct,. Sydney Conference, 10-12 Nov 2000), onine: The Lavoisier Group Inc. <http://
ww, laulnier com.au pipcrs, articcs, EvansKyoto.html>.
124 Henry Lamb, "'Kynio fhe Consequences." online: Ciizcn Re\ic\ OnLine <http:'
ww',.citi/enrc, ic\sontne.org,ncvs stories 398cS.html " .
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other international treat, is this: If Kvoto is brought into effect, the
economic dislocation which must tbllo its implementation will be
unprecedented in modem times. It will be equi\ alent to the famines of the
earl' nineteenth century in its disrupti\e pow\er, (except that the famines
\\ ere folIo\\ ed b\ good seasons). There arc some treaties which Australia
has ratified which ha\ e caused economic loss to Australians and to people
in other countries. The Basel Con\ention is the best known example. But
the extent of the economic loss due to Basel is minuscule, at least in
Australia, and understood by ver, few people. The Kyoto Protocol is a
different thing indeed, compared with Basel.'2"
In contrast to these voices, the other side of the narrative stresses the
benefits to both the environment and to developing countries. As stated in
a recent World Bank article entitled, "Supporting Poor Communities
under the Kyoto Protocol," "The [Community Development Carbon Fund]
will provide financial support to small-scale greenhouse gas reduction
projects in the least developed countries and poor communities in devel-
oping countries. Poorer communities wvill get the advantage of develop-
ment dollars coming their \ay. and participants in the fund will receive
carbon emission reduction credits for reductions in carbon emissions.'1
27
The pro-Ki oto Protocol side of the debate also minimizes the impact on
the infringement to traditional notions of national sovereignty. For example,
in the 1998 hearings before the U.S. House of Representative's Interna-
tional Relations Committee, there was much discussion of the effects of
the Protocol on sovereignty and especially its economic impact given the
mandated reduction of emissions. During the hearings, experts addressed
two key concerns, namely that the Protocol would not be applied to the
Department of Defense emissions and fears that the Protocol would create
a "super U.N. secretariat." With respect to the first concern, it was
reported that "the President determined recently that to ensure defense
readiness, he will propose that military operations and training be
completely held harmless from any national emissions limits that might be
adopted."'2 : With respect to the second concern, Mr. Eizenstadt, U.S.
126. Evans, supra note 123.
127. \"orld Bank, "Supporting Poor Communities Under the Kyoto Protocol," online: World Bank
<http:/web.worldbank.org/WBSITE 'EXTERNAL N EWSO,contentM DK :20120004-menuPK:34459
-pagePK:64003015-pi PK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html>.
128. U.S., The Kvoto Protocol: Problems with US. Sovereignty and the Lack "I Developing Coun-
in
, 
Participation: Hearing Before the L'S. House of Rep. Committee on Int'l Relations. 105th (Cong.
2d Sess. (13 May 1998). online: <http.//commdocs.house gox'committees/intlrel/hfa4942'.000,
hfa494250f.htm.
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Undersecretary of State for economics, business, and agriculture, attempted
to alia tears of a world dominating United Nations. He said:
A second misconception is that someho\% the protocol will create a super
S.N. Secretariat, threatening t ;.S. soxereignty. That is also fallacious. The
review process and the protocol simply codifies already existing practices
under the 1992 Rio Con ention. The review process is not by some
centralized U.N. Secretariat, it is intergovernmental. The review teams
are chosen hx the goernment officials and then they can only come into
a country with the invitation of that government. They cannot come onto
any private property unless the propert\ owner himself or herself permits
it. Theret will be 17 black helic optcr svooping down on lurin. Also, this
intergoxernmental team recently \]isited in April the U.S. Capitol, met
with congressional staff and \Member,, of the Congress, and the Capitol
Istillcianl . So the notion that f.onehow people are gi~n.i to be intruding
on our .sovereignty i.\ simplv and totally untrue. Finally, there are some
who suggest the protocol is going to result in a huge govemment transfer
of foreign aid to Russia. That is also not true. U.S. private sector firms
ma\ on their ox\ n choose to purchase international emission,, credits from
Russia or any other country that w\ ants to sell them. It will be purely a
private decision. The U.S. (o\ ernment is not transferring taxpavers' money
to anyone. Indeed, this \\ ill be one of the crucial \\ay s that the private
sector can achiese cost-cffcctixc reductions. It vill be their decision.3 °
The \arious positions of the txo sides, as reflected in the above quota-
tions, make clear that each has internalized a traditional and monolithic
conception of sosereignty. No one, it seems (except perhaps law profes-
sors and other academics) came out and said that there is no such thing
anymore as an impermeable membrane called sovereignty surrounding
national territories that must never be relinquished, even in matters of glo-
bal ens ironmental concern. The territorial conception of sovereignty is
apparent in Mr. Eizenstadt's response, when he states that there is no intru-
sion of national sovereignty because -[t]here will be no black helicopters
swooping down on farms."'' This oser simplistic (and perhaps jocular)
expression of this pro-Kvoto position shows that the porous and postmodem
notions of so\ ereignty have not yet infused discourse occurring on the
domestic level.
On the international plane, however. there was a different conception
of sovereignty being discussed and employed. The new sovereignty
130. lhid (emphasis added).
13 1. Ibid.
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became apparent in the interaction bct\\ ccn states and environmental non-
go\ernmental organizations (lINGOs). 132 Reportedly, at the sixth Frame-
work Convention Conference of the Parties at The Hague in November
2000, "representatives of NGOs outnumbered representatives of States."' 33
It should be mentioned that NGOs are frequently excluded from closed
door sessions at formal treaty negotiation sessions, and arc further disad-
vantaged because "the institutional setting fa\ours a more moderate
approach than is advocated by ENGOs."'134 But this institutional bias is
counteracted \ hen N,0s are able to exert their force through public opin-
ion and in other less formal axs. Betsill underscores the important role of
NGOs:
In the KN oto Protocol negotiations. ENGOs pla\ ed important roles behind
the scenes and influenced the negotiations in \\ avs that cannot readily be
observed in the treaty text. Bx focusing only on the effects of NGO activ ity
on the outcome of international negotiations, one runs the risk of missing
the ways that \GOs shape the proccss of the negotiations. [N(i()s
influenced the K\oto Protocol negotiations by catalyzing and framing
debates on emissions trading and sinks, and b\ increasing pressure on
States to reach agreement. Thus. E\GO activities ha\ c had indirect effects
on the final agreement.'
Betsill further reports that "[d]uring the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, some
ENGOs organized demonstrations and protest activ ities to draw public and
media attention to the negotiations and the issue of climate change."
3 1"
In the context of the new international law, according to Betsill, "the
notion of sovereignty is being redefined in the post-Cold War era. suggest-
ing that there could be greater opportunity for ENGOs to shape interna-
tional climate change negotiations."'3' The President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. Jessica Mathews, reportedly contends
"that power is shifting to ne\\ actors: 'National governments are not
132. See Michele Betsill. "Enironmental NGOs \lcet the Sovereign State: The Kvoto Protocol
Negotiations on Global Climate Change" (2102) 13 Colo. J. Int'l Ent'l. L. & Pol'y 49
133. Ibid. at49
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid. at 56-57.
136. Ibid. at 55. "For example, during COP I in Berlin, three Greenpeace activists uspended them-
selves from a smoke stack near Cologne, Germany. in an effort to highlight the role of coal-burning
power stations as carbon dioxide emitters. At COP 3, Japanese ENGOs covered bushes outside the
conference hall wsith messages, such as -Are U going to save us, Al'." and (ircenpeace erected a
dinosaur made out of used oil cans and spare car parts."
137. Ibid. at 52.
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simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing
po\\crs including political, social, and security roles at the core of
sovereignty - with businesses, with international organizations, and with
a multitude of citizens groups ..... ""' Betsill also cites Professor Karen
Litfin as pointing out that "the development of international environmen-
tal regimes challenges the authority of States: '[Once] States have acceded
to non-binding principles or other weak agreements, they usually find it
difficult not to agree to increasingly more robust commitments."139 Betsill
concludes that "ENGOs can influence negotiations by holding States
accountable to their prior commitments to protect the environment, thereby
limiting the ability of States to make autonomous decisions."'"4
Stepping back for a moment from the specifics of the Kyoto Protocol,
a broader consideration to be addressed is the force independently exerted
in recent years in an increasing way against efforts to support environmen-
tal protection generally. Richard Falk has identified the process of
economic globalization as exerting "a downward pull on the efforts to
address various environmental challenges through effective regulatory
efforts."' 4' He argues that "given the time horizons of policy makers,
economic globalization and environmental protection stress fundamentally
inconsistent policy objectives that could be rendered compatible only by
the imposition of effective regulatory authority based on an underlying
political equilibrium between competing economistic and environmental-
ist constituencies." 142
Falk's insight is important because it suggests another bias which
exists simultaneously overlaid onto the puzzle of state-centric sovereignty.
As he recounts, the old paradigm which explained the downside of the
state-centered system is no longer explanatorily adequate. The old para-
digm was characterized by the "essentially inward-looking nature of
political authority in the world," and held that the state as a self-interested
party could not therefore protect the global commons.143 "This was attrib-
uted to a generalized reluctance of states to cooperate externally, and more
specifically, to the related inability to solve the free-rider problem.
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even greater difficulty. Under the new paradigm, "'all governments are
increasingly subject to the discipline of global capital in relation to
organizing their activities and setting their priorities \\rith respect to public
expenditures and goals."' 4
Globalization, for Falk, is a tremendous force which exists and
functions to a large extent on its own accord or, to use another metaphor,
like a nin-a\\a\ train. "[T]he increasingly, globalized character of trade,
finance, and inx estment, as reinforced by media, computerization, and
advertising, have created strong regulatory imperativcs that appear for
various reasons to go beyond the capacity and will of states to manage,
either directly or on their own, or indirectly through the establishment of
international regimes."'4a Thus concei\ ed, Falk \ iexx\s globalization as a
"world-order crisis of a structural and ideological character that has not
existed in prior historical periods."" Under this xie\\. the traditional indi-
viduated state is sapped of its power not by any concerted conscious effort
at global goxernance or regime change (like the Kyoto Protocol) but
instead because of a basic. s\stemic condition that is changing the land-
scape of the world, both literalh and figuratively.
Falk is careful in his conclusion to temper his remarks about the
dangers and pressures created bN globalization by the cav eat that "global-
ization is not weighted by its nature against en\ ironmentalism."'4" Rather,
"[i]t is globalization as shaped by neo-liberalism in a world of \ery
diverse sovereign states ... " that encounters environmentalism. There
are pressures which wyork to counteract environmental regulation, for
example, "the une\ enness of material conditions around the world, which
makes it difficult for some actors to feel responsible for environmental
decay of a global scope and others to feel unfairly expected to bear dispro-
portionate costs in relation to environmental cleanups."' 5 In Falk's view,
the neo-liberal willingness to promote economic growth makes environ-
mentalist concerns "less pressing."' An ensuing "crisis in public goods"
has resulted, one x\ hich "places a premium on reduced government expen-
ditures of public goods of all varieties ... definitely including environmen-
tal protection. "'  2
145 Ibid.
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Globalization may be viewed as another bias which may force state
actors into positions of reduced responsibility. It is a new and awe-inspir-
ing characteristic of international life not encompassed by any of the old
metaphors of the sovereign state or even by "the society or system of
states.""' Instead, globalization is a metaphor itself for problems like
environmental degradation, terrorism, and fluctuations in trade and the
wxorld economy that exist beyond the comprehension and solution of any
one state or e\ en a minority of individually powerful states." 4
2. Jurisdiction
The next major international legal discourse to be examined concerns the
changing conception ofjurisdiction. Like so\ ereignty, notions ofjurisdic-
tion have developed in many \ays, influencing how state actors, corpo-
rate entities, and individuals conceive the limitations placed upon the
exercise of state power. The evolution of the concept of jurisdiction is
intimately linked with changes in the conception of sovereignty, discussed
above in Part 1. 1. Jurisdiction, like sovereignty, has become divested from
a strictly territorial relationship with the state; it has been expanded to
meet the needs of an increasingly interdependent and globalized world.
To the extent that the discourse about jurisdiction, like sovereignty,
perpetuates antiquated and biased modes of \ iewing the world, it must be
reinterpreted and reformulated to better meet the needs of contemporary
international society. To place this discourse in perspective, it is necessary
to look at the w ay jurisdiction was conceived of by United States courts in
the nineteenth and early txwcntieth century.
In The Schooncr Exchange, decided in 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court
was called upon to decide: "'whether an American citizen could assert, in
an American court, title to [a public] armed [foreign] vessel found within
U.S. \waters. " ' The Court answered in the negative. The decision hinged
on the C ourt's understanding of the nature of jurisdiction, territorial sover-
eignty. and consent. Its jurisdictional discourse was framed as follows:
The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that \% hich is possessed by the
nation ast an independent ,overeign power
153. Ihid at 4
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The jurisdiction of the nation \\ithin its own territory is necessarily
excluSi\re and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imp/l a diminution ofits sovt'vigntV to the extent ofthe restriction,
and an investment of that sovereigntv to the saint' extent in that power
which could inpost, such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within
its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.
They can flow from no other legitimate source.
This consent ma\ be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less
determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if
understood, not less obligator'. -
As this passage shows,jurisdiction \\as intimately connected with the state's
territory and was not to be infringed except by consent.
Because of the mutual exclusivitx of sovereign power, the general rule
described in The Schooner Exchange was that "[the] full and absolute
territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and
being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to
contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects."' 57
This shows the Court's reluctance to presume any type of extraterritorial
application of jurisdiction. A state could however exercise jurisdiction
o\ er foreign persons or entities within its borders. Such exercise would be
suspended however provided a specific license was given for the activity
under consideration or in certain exceptional situations. 58
In 4merican Banana CompanY v. United Fruit CompanY, decided in
1909, the Supreme Court again wrestled with the scope ofjurisdiction, but
this time in the context of activities occurring outside the territory of the
United States, "and within that of other states." 59 The plaintiff brought an
action to recover three-fold damages under the Sherman .Act alleging that
its operations had been unfairly interfered with by the defendant corpora-
tion. The plaintiff claimed inter alia that "in July [1904], Costa Rican
soldiers and officials, instigated by the defendant, seized a part of the plan-
156. Ibid. at 136 (emphasis added).
157. Ibid.
158. For example, the exemption of the person of a foreign sovereign from arrest or detention, the
immunity of foreign ministers, and waiver ofjurisdiction over troops of a foreign prince allowed to
pass through a territory.
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tation and a cargo of supplies and haxe held them ever since, and stopped
the construction and operation of [plaintiff's] plantation and railway."""
\Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes took great pains to base hisjuris-
dictional nalTative on the precept that -'[a]Ill legislation is prima facie
territorial."'' "" Holmes began his analysis by expressing surprise that any
other conception of jurisdiction could be concei\cd: "[i]t is obvious that,
hocxexer stated, the plaintiff's case depends on several rather startling
propositions. In the first place, the acts causing damage were done ...
outside the jurisdiction of the United States ... It is surprising to hear it
argued that the\ \\ere go\erned b\ [an] act of Congress.""-2 For the Court,
"not only x\crc the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not
within the Sherman. Itt, but they x\ere not torts by the la\\ of the place, and
therefore \\ere not torts at all, howcxer contrary to the ethical and
economic postulates of that statute."" ' Although the Court acknowledged
that an American defendant corporation is bound by the laws of the United
States, it found dispositixc the fact that the acts of other states - namely
Panaiia and Costa Rica --- were involved: "a seizure by a state is not a
thing that can be complained of elsewhere in the courts [of a foreign
nation]."'1 4
It is fascinating to juxtapose the judicial discourse within The Schoo-
ner Exchange and American Banana \kith more recent and sophisticated
conceptions of jurisdiction exemplified in the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law and recent cases. Modern viexws about jurisdiction
haxe developed hc\ond reference to the territorial locus of the parties'
actions: they now encompass a broad range of other principles which
focus on the nationalities of parties and national interest and which co-
exist or ox erlap x\ith the territorial principle. Such N iews can be found
embedded x\ ithin Section 402 of the Restatement, \\hich provides:
Subject to § 403. a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
tci11 hor,:
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its
territory,
(c) conduct outside its territorx that has or is intended to ha\e
substantial effect within its territory:
160 Ibid at 354-55
161. Ibid. at 357 citing Exparte'Bai, L. R 12 (h. Div. 522 at 52. State v Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499:
Peoph/ w A-riill, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. So) at 596)
162 Ibid. at 355 (emphasis added).
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(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as
\ elI as within its territor\: and
(3) certain conduct outside its territorx h\ persons not its nationals that is
directed against the sccurit\ of the statc or against a limited class of
ottcr state interests ' 5
Within Section 402 is the still thriving territorial principle reflected in three
parts of subsection ( I t. Subsection (2) embodies the so-called "nationality
principle" and subsection (3 , the "protective principle." '
Section 403 of the Restatement, referred to in Section 412, prov ides
the limitations on a state's exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe. The
flexibilit\ of 403 is especially apparent in its reliance on the tort concept of
"reasonableness." Under Section 4t3( 1 ), a state may not cxercisejurisdic-
tion "\\ ith respect to a person or acti\ it\ having connections with another
state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."'5 7 Subsec-
tion (2) -ixes further guidance to the legislator, adjudicator, or party by
enumerating various factors to be applied in determining "unreasonable-
ness," including:
(a) the link of the activit\ to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the acti\ it\ takes place within the territory. or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territor\:
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic actix it.
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible
for the activity to be regulated. or between that state and those x hom
the regulation is designed to protect:
(c) the character of the activit\ to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to \\hich other states
regulate such activities. and the degree to xwhich the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted.
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation:
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system:
(f) the extent to w\hich the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system:
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity: and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.""
165. Rest. (Third) of Foreign Relations La\% of the United States at § 402
166. See Lori F. Damrosch et al.. supra note 4 at 1090-1135-
167. Supra note 165 at § 403(1)
168. Ibid. at § 403(2).
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Subsection (3) imposes a hortatory duty of good faith and deference upon
two states where a conflict in jurisdiction exists: "a state should defer to
the other state if that state's interest is clearly greater."'69
The jurisdictional principles set forth within these Restatement
sections, as applied by modern United States courts, have resulted in
inconsistent and divergent results. 7' In some instances, the net of extra-
territorial jurisdiction has been cast widely, to catch cases involving drug
trafficking' 7' trade, business interests, and alleged Sherman Act viola-
tions. 7 2 Ftoxc\ cr, in other types of cases involving employment discrimi-
nation under Title VIl,"7 the environment,'74 and constitutional guarantees
such as the Fourth Amendment,'7 : the courts have refused to extend juris-
diction extraterritorially. Is there a clear line of demarcation between these
two sets of cases? Is there a rationale that helps to explain their
divergences and to prcscrxc some jurisdictional discourse which is both
coherent and appropriately tailored to modem social, political and cultural
conditions? Or, are the courts instead laboring under biased notions of
jurisdiction rooted in outmoded and inappropriate conceptions of sover-
eignty, territory, and national interest?
Take for instance Lnited States v. .lcoa, where in 1945 the U.S.
Second Circuit Court considered whether the Sherman Act applied to
activities of a foreign corporation, allegedly in constraint of trade in
aluminum ingots, which had taken place outside the United States.'77 The
court was careful to frame the main issue in terms of consequences for the
United States. This crucial formulation is apparent in the following
passage:
Did either the agreement of 1931 or that of 1936 violate § I of the Act?
The answer does not depend upon whether " e shall recognize as a source
of liability a liability imposed by another state. On the contrary we are
concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the
169. Ibid. at 403(3).
17() See Robert Malley et al, "Constructing the State Extratemtorially: Jurisdictional Discourse,
the National Interest, and Transnational Norms" ( 1P99i 103 HarN. L. Rev. 1273.
171. See US. v \,riega, 117 F3d 1 )20f, (IIth Cir. 1997).
172 See US. v Alcoa, 148 F,2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945; (ontental Ore Co v U'nin Carbide & Car-
hon Corp., 370 US 690 (1962).
173. See Boureslan v Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014. 1016 (5th Cir.), reh g granted, 863 F2d 8 (5th Cir.
19X8), at/ den hanc, 892 F2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990).
174 See Natural Resources IX/'nwi' Council, Inc v Vui i'ar Regulatoiir Commission, 647 F.2d
1345, (D.C.Cir. 1981).
175. US i i ard L'riiindc, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (19I)i).
176 Supra note 172.
177. Ibid. at 421
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conduct outside the United States of persons not in allegiance to it. That
being so. the on]\ question open is whether Congress intended to impose
the liability, and whether our o\ n Constitution permitted it to do so: as a
court of the United States. \\c cannot look beyond our own law.
Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as
those in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily obserxed
by nations upon the exercise of their po\\ ers, limitations which generally
correspond to those fixed b\ the 'Conflict of La\k s.' Iff should not impute
to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch./br conduct
which has no coicqu nces it ithin the U nitcd Statc,, 7,
This emphasis on "consequences within the United States" is wholly
absent from the subsequently overruled American Banana case, which had
taken a less sophisticated, more bright-line, on-off approach to jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit Court in Alcoa candidly admitted that it was going
beyond precedent b\ reading the Sherman Act so broadly. Judge Learned
Hand. writing for the court, remarked as follows: "It is true that in [prior]
cases the persons held liable had sent agents into the United States to per-
form part of the agreement: but an agent is merely an animate means of
executing his pnncipal's purposes. and, for the purposes of this case, he
does not differ from an inanimate means: besides, only human agents can
import and sell ingot."'" This transition from "animate" to "inanimate"
means, while made almost as an aside, represents a major transition. It
shows the willingness of the court to begin to apply and formulate a more
common-sensical "reasonableness" test, undeterred by technicalities.
Consider also the judicial approach pervading US. v. Noriega, decided
by the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court in 1997. Manuel Noriega appealed his
convictions in the Southern District of Florida for drug trafficking.""
Noriega's principal arguments were that the indictments against him should
have been dismissed by the district court due to "his status as a head of
state and the manner in which the United States brought him to justice." '
In addressing the "head of state" argument the court relied explicitly on
The Schooner Exchange:
The Supreme Court long ago held that "[t]he jurisdiction of courts is a
branch of that which is possessed bv the nation as an independent sovereign
power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
178. Ibid. at 443.
179. Ibid. at 444.
180. Supra note 171.
181. Ibid. at 1209.
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xclusike and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself." The Schooner Exchan,ic vh 1Eaddon, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
13(, 3 LEd. 287 (1812). The Court, l1o\ex er, ruled that nations, including
the United States, had agreed implicitly to accept certain limitations on
their individual territorial jurisdiction based on the "common interest
impelling [sovereign nations] to mutual intercourse, and an interchange
of good offices x ith each other..... Id. at 137. Chief among the exceptions
to jurisdiction was "the exemption of the person of the sovereign from
arrest or detention within a foreign territory."" '
The Eleventh Circuit Court proceeded to discuss how The Schooner
Exchange doctrine subsequently led to the development of the modem
notion of foreign so\ereign immunity and its eventual codification in the
For(Ign Sovereign Inniunities.-Ict, passed in 1977.1 3 Since the Act did not
address "head of state" immunity in the criminal context, the court held
that the only \ray immunity could attach \x as through reference to "the
principles and procedures outlined in The Schooner Exchange and its prog-
eny." ' "4 Moreover, the court found itself obligated to "look to the Execu-
tive Branch for direction on the propriety of Noriega's immunity claim. ' " 5
By providing that the judicial branch "must look to the Executive
Branch" for guidance, the Court in effect self-consciously abnegated its
role in deciding the case in deference to the recognition bestowed or with-
held by the political branch. The Executive Branch, generally, follows one
of three paths with respect to such recognition: "( I ) explicitly suggests
immunity- (2) expressly declines to suggest immunity; or (3) offers no
guidance.' ' 6 "Some courts ha, e held that absent a formal suggestion of
immunity, a putative head of state should receive no immunity."" - In
\riia. :' case, the court ultimately denied the defendant's immunity claim,
noting that the Executiv e Branch had "not merely refrained from taking a
position. . .[but pursued] Noriega's capture and his prosecution ... [thus
manifesting] its clear sentiment that Noriega should be denied head-of-
state immunity.""' Moreover, the Court further pointed out that "Noriega
ne\ er scr' ed as the constitutional leader of Panama" and that "Panama has
not sought immunity for Noriega.
182 Ibid. at 121 1
183 See Fjrei n S', eren Immunties.Ic ht, 28 U.S.C. ,§ 1602 -1 H I [FSIA].
1 s4 Vorieu.a, supra note 171 at 1212.
IX5 Ibid.
I,6 Ihd
187, Ibid. citing In re Doe. 860 F.2d 40 at 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
I NA Ibid.
189 Ibid.
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Although Ah.ca wvas a civil action and Nori'ga involved criminal drug-
trafficking, both cases illustrate the judicial techniques to justify and
articulate their exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign defen-
dants. In Boureslan v. .4rainco,"" however, the court rejected the exercise
of jurisdiction in an (arguably) more compelling situation involving a United
States plaintiff and defendant. In that case, the Fifth Circuit framed the
issue as follo\N s: "Does Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]...
regulate the employment practices of businesses which, although
incorporated in the United States, employ citizens of the United States in
foreign countries?" ,, The plaintiff, a naturalized American citizen of
Lebanese descent, alleged he was subjected to discrimination on the basis
of his race, religion and national origin while employed in the defendant's
offices in Saudi Arabia.'93 The Court rejected the plaintiff's main
argument that extraterritorial application of Title VII was mandated by
drawing a "negative inference" from the statute's "alien exemption
provision.""' The Court similarly rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the
legislative history of Title VII. suggesting extraterritorial application;
instead it held that the statute fell "far short of the clear expression of
congressional intent required to o\ ercome the presumption against extra-
territorial application." 5
What lurks beneath the surface of the court's reasoning in Boureslan
was its worry about the sovereign rights of other nations, as evidenced by
its obsernation that "[t]he religious and social customs practiced in many
countries are wholly at odds with those of this country." "" Although not
addressed directly by the majority, this subconscious preoccupation is
apparent. The subtext of the opinion is that by applying Title VII abroad
other nations' sovereign rights could be infringed in violation of the
territorial principle enshrined in The Schooner Exchange and American
Banana.'" Both the defendant and the amicus curiae had argued that the
application of Title VII abroad .vould be "unreasonable" under the
Restatement Section 403. As the dissent made clear, one of the arguments
was that "because labor relations are a peculiarly domestic matter, it would
be an affront to the sovereignty of other nations to apply Title VII
extraterritorially."
190. Supra note 173 at 1014.
191. Pub. L. 88-352 co-amended; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
192. Supra note 173 at 1016.
193. Ibid. at 1016.
194. Ibid. at 1018.
195. Ibid. at 1019.
196. Ibid. at 1020.
197. Ibid. at 1026.
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The dissent conducted an exhaustive analysis of the reasonableness of
applying Title VII to U.S. citizens abroad and found dispositive that the
statute was expressly exempted from application to aliens.' "Since Title
VII expressly exempts from coverage aliens employed abroad by U.S. cor-
porations, the logical negative inference is that Title VII was intended to
cover U.S. citizens employed abroad. Indeed, the alien exemption provi-
sion would be meaningless if Title VII did not apply extraterritorially. .",199
For the dissent, it was not unreasonable to apply the statute abroad
because there would be no conflict with other nations' local laws:
The argument that extraterritorial application of Title VII is unreasonable
because it would offend the sovereignty of other nations is not persuasive.
The fact that another nation may exercise jurisdiction over employment
relations on the basis of territory does not render the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction on the basis of nationality unreasonable. The likelihood that
concurrent jurisdiction would produce international discord is minimized
by the fact that the United States seeks to regulate only the conduct of its
own nationals and by the fact that Title VII may be reconciled with foreign
law in the event of a conflict.2"
The fact that there might be "concurrent jurisdiction" does not automati-
cally result in a determination of unreasonableness: "[i]nternational
discord does not arise from the existence of concurrent jurisdiction alone
as much as it arises from an attempt to regulate the conduct of foreign
nationals." '"
198. As provided in 42 U.S.C , 2000 e-i.
199. Supra note 173 at 1032.
200. Ibid. at 1031.
201, Ibid. at 1029 In addition to labour law cases, the application of U.S. law extraterritorially has
also been denied in the context of environmental regulation. In Vatural Resources Defense Council
v %uclear Regulator
" 
Commisvion, 647 F 2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981) the Court opined at page 1357:
-[w]e do honor to the sovereignty of national governments, our own included, when we respect
foreign public policy by not automatically displacing theirs ssith ours. This calls for a thorough
understanding of our interests as defined by Congress...swe can then reasonably balance the scope of
our own regulation alongside the rightful regulatory jurisdiction [of the foreign state]." On several
occasions the U S. courts have either sidestepped or denied the application of the U.S. National
Environmental Protection Act, 42 U S.C. §§ 432 1-4347 (1969) [AEP-] extraterritorially when an
issue of foreign state sovereignty was involved: see Sierra Club v Coleman, 578 F2d 389 (D.C. Cir.
I 978); IEP4 Coalition of Japan r [spin, 837 F Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993). Mavaguezanos por la
Salud v elAmbiente v US., 3X F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Puerto Rico 1999); Born Free USA v Norton, 278
F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D C. 2003). Compare cases applying NEPA extraterritorially to Antarctica and the
high seas where no sovereignty extends: see Environimental Defense Fund. Inc. % MarseV, 986 F 2d
52X (D.C. Cir. 1993), Centre for Dialogical Diversimtv v. Nat 7. Science Foundation, 2002 WL 31548073
(ND. Cal Oct. 30. 2002); Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v US Dept. of Navy, 2002 WL
32095131 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002)
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Commentators on the jurisdictional discourses running through the
American cases have noted that the language of "national interest" or
"common good" serves to reflect and reinforce "the dominant, hierarchi-
cal structures and naturalizes the position of those in power who decide
what is best for the "we'"'.2 - The authors of the leading critical article on
this subject, Malley, Manas and Nix, point out:
On the domestic level, appeals to "shared values"' have been used to justify
the subordinated position of, among others, blacks and women. Similarly,
in discussions of extraterritoriality, appeals to "shared"' beliefs have
justified an expansiv e conception ofjurisdiction in such fields as antitrust
and securities, but a more constricted version in areas such as the
constitutional rights of aliens and anti-discrimination laws. Thus, the
securities fraud activities of a foreign defendant against a foreign company
in Canada have been prescribed. although the discriminatory practices of





The authors make the important point that "the language of jurisdic-
tional argument matters, because language both communicates social mean-
ing and, by circumscribing the NN ays in which communication takes place,
creates meaning." '- One solution to the divergences and inconsistencies
of the judicial application of jurisdiction in these American cases is to
apply an alternative discourse, one embracing a new conception of the
state and sovereign power. For Malley, Manas and Nix,
jurisdictional arguments couched in the univocal language of territory,
citizenship, or national interest obscure the complexity of the substantive
issues at stake and fail to provide meaningful guidance to decisionmakers.
As one commentator has argued, debates about extraterritoriality "protect
the discourse from having to assert its own normative theory." [citing
David Kennedy, International Legal Structures (1986) at 126]. Although
perceived and presented as a "preliminary"' matter, determination of
justiciability actually regiments the outcome of the inquiry.205
202. Malley et al., supra note 170 at 1293.
203. Ibid. at 1293 (citing Boureslan v. Aramco. supra note 173, among other cases).
204. Ibid. at 1290 (citing James B. White, Heracles 'Bow: Ev sasy on the Rhetoric of the Law (Madi-
son, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); John Cole, "Thoughts from the Land ofAnd" (1988)
39 Mercer L.Rev. 907 at 921-25 (describing language as determining what "is" in the world)).
205. Ibid. at 1303-04.
482 The Dalhousie Law Journal
While these commentators admit that "framing the issue differently might
not have led the courts in any of these cases to reach different jurisdic-
tional results... [Lthc point is that] [tihe courts' rhetoric corresponded to a
particular geography of the jurisdictional world, one in which self-
proclaimed national interests were given precedence over transnational
groups' normative claims.... 2fi
While the approach of Malley, Manas and Nix is generally acceptable,
it should be noted that alternative discourses are also susceptible to bias,
mislabeling and misunderstanding, because w\ hat counts as "interests" may
\ary among cultures and societies, and even among individuals. In
particular cases, the interests at stake necessarily will be largely defined
by the parties' themselves and other interests will be left out of the discus-
sion, just by the very nature of the litigation process. Moreover, although
these authors admit that perhaps jurisdictional results would not change
gixen application by the judges of alternative conceptualizations of state
power, it is certainly true that in reality the jurisdictional results in these
and future cases x\ ill indeed change if different discourses and assump-
tions are used. Assuming arguendo that such changes in discourse will
lead to different outcomes in specific cases, the next question is whether
the results will be good or bad.
The answer to this question inevitably introduces the paradox of
universalism. On one hand there is the attractiveness of exporting liberal
\alues and the beneficial effects which greater rights and regulation may
have on people's lives around the world, either by applying NEP4"s envi-
ronmental standards in the Philippines, American anti-discrimination labour
laws in Saudi Arabia, or the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment in Mexico.
On the other hand, there is the equally serious danger of cultural, ideologi-
cal and value imperialism. Malley, Manas and Nix attempt to address this
objection, in their discussion of the critique they term, "imperialism in
disguise." Their answers however do not resolve the conundrum of
universalism. First, they argue that "recognition of alternative solidarities
does not imply disregard for national ties.""1 7 Their second counter-argu-
ment is that "normative orders do not coincide strictly with national
entities; rather, they cut through national boundaries. Within the frame-
work suggested here, then, norms are imposed neither by nor on nations,
but by certain transnational groups on others. Hence, all jurisdictional
resolutions encroach upon the normative order of some transnational group.
206. Ibid. at 1300.
207 Ibid. at 1301.
Critique, Culture and Commitment
This is as true of assertions of jurisdiction as it is of denials of jurisdic-
tion."00
With respect to the first argument, it is true that in some situations
using an alternatiPe discourse \\ould not necessarily mean disregarding
national ties. But the use of an alternative discourse in other cases maxI
mean that one set of laws is being privileged over another, namely in situ-
ations of concurrent jurisdiction where a conflict exists. In such cases,
Section 403 mandates the application of a "reasonableness" test involving
a balance of certain factors in order to ensure that the outcome is fair to all
parties. But the problem with this approach is that the required balance is
determined b\ a judge who is replete wxith personal assumptions, biases,
cultural presuppositions. values and indoctrinated societal goals. These
goals and \ alues may be at odds with the laws and practices of people in
another nation.
As to the second argument that "normative orders do not coincide strictly
with national entities," while true in some cases, it does not assist in
answering the paradox of universalism. As the authors correctly observe,
".\ ithin the framework suggested here ... norms are imposed neither by
nor on nations, but by certain transnational groups on others."'0 9 Yet the
conundrum with respect to the dangers of imperialism on the one hand and
universal values on the other is not resolved by re-labeling those who
impose their norms as a "transnational group" as opposed to a "nation"
within the context of specific cases. The salient and important point made
by Malley, Manas and Nix is that over-reliance on notions of sovereignty
and self-determination can "take on an ironic, even hollow quality" in
specific cases in light of cultural values that dictate a different outcome.2 1'
While this may be true, \x hat is hollow to one person may not be to others,
especially to those on the other side of the case arguing for the preserva-
tion of their transnational groups' values and interests - or what the first
party may consider their biases and prejudices.
3. State Responsibiliti
This section examines the international legal discourses about state
responsibility and the built-in biases and prejudices surrounding this term.
208. Ibid.
209. Ibid.
210. Malley et al. use Alartin i Republic ol S,,uh.4fria, 836 F.2d 91 (2d ir. 1987) as an example
of a case where "sovereignty" and "self-determination" rang "hollow" duc to the fact that the dis-
criminatory conduct in that case - leaving a black man at the scene of an accident- was violative of
a fundamental norm.
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As the name itself suggests, there is great emphasis placed upon the state,
along with certain assumptions in the discourse about state power, attribu-
tion, and how liability does or does not attach to individuals within the
state structure. The efforts of the International Law Commission (ILC) in
recent years to articulate the rules of state responsibility through Draft
Articles will be discussed. Especially important to this inquiry is the
impact and effect of these Articles on the future of international law. As
some scholars have concluded, the Articles may do more harm than good
because they may represent a counter-productive and even dangerous path
which does a disservice to the deeper and more long lasting goals of inter-
national society.2 ''
One of the first discussions of state responsibility in modem times is
found in the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Coi'/i Channel Case.2"2 The first of two issues articulated by the Court
related to state responsibility and was as follows:
Is Albania responsible under international laN for the explosions which
occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage
and loss of human life which resulted from them and is there any duty to
pay compensation?"
The second issue concerned whether the United Kingdom had breached
Albanian sovereignty by the actions of the Royal Navy.2"4 In the Court's
opinion, "from all the facts and observations [set forth previously in the
opinion], the Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield
which caused the explosions ... could not have been accomplished with-
out the knowledge of the Albanian government." 2"5
What is interesting is that, as the Court reported, the "obligations
resulting for Albania from this knowledge [were] not disputed between
the parties." ' Thus, even in this early discourse on the state responsibil-
ity, there remained a general consensus amongst states about certain
principles of responsibility based on their knowledge of a particular state
of affairs. But the opinion did not address, and so leaves unclear, what it
would mean for a state to "know" something - i.e., what level and
211. See Phillip Allott, "State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law" (1988) 29
Harv Int'l L.J. 1.
212. Supra note 56.
213. Ibid. at 6.
214 See ibid.
215. Ibid. at 22
216 Ibid.
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number of individuals within the state's structure would satisfy this knowl-
edge requirement. Assuming, as the Court found, this knowledge existed,
then the Albanian "state" had a duty to notify shipping in the area about
the minefield. This duty arose not from the Hague Convention of 1907,
"which is applicable in time of wvar, but on certain general and well recog-
nized principles, namely: elementary considerations of humanity, even more
exacting in peace than in xwar, the principle of the freedom of maritime
communication: and everv State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrar, to the rights of other States. 217
The other important outcome for the state in Cor/u Channel is that it
may be held liable not only for its acts but also for its failures to act. In the
words of the Court: "[i]n fact nothing was attempted by the Albanian
authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave omissions involve the
international responsibility of Albania."' " On the second issue regarding
Albanian sovereignty the Court determined that "the United Kingdom
violated the so\ereignty of the People's Republic of Albania, and that this
declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate satisfaction.1 2,9
Interestingly, the sovereignty issue was overshadowed by the importance
of the state responsibility issue. This is apparent from the Court's award of
money damages to the United Kingdom for the explosions and loss of life
but only a declaration for Albania for its loss of sovereignty. -221'
The explanation for this imbalance in remedies available to each side
of the dispute is illuminated by Judge AIvarez's separate concurring
opinion, which provided a more sophisticated and nuanced view of state
responsibility. For Judge Alvarez, state responsibility for different acts or
omissions varies in character and severity. He cited three general catego-
ries: "international delinquencies, prejudicial acts, and unlawful acts. 22t
One example of an international delinquency is the very inaction
complained of in the instant case, i.e., "acts contrary to the sentiments of
humanity committed by a state in its territory, even with the object of
defending its security and its vital interests, jor instance, the laving of
submarine mines without noti'ying the countries concerned." 22' For
Alvarez, a "prejudicial act" is "one which causes prejudice to a State or to
its nationals, but which does so by means of acts not constituting an inter-
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid. at 23.
219. Ibid. at 36.
220. Ibid.
221. Ibid- at 45.
222. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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national delinquency, e.g.. as a consequence of an insurrection, civil war,
etc." '22 Finally, an unlawful act - e.g., the one committed by the United
Kingdom in v iolating Albanian sovereignty - is "one which disregards or
violates the rights of a State, or which is contrary to international law ....
Thei respon.ihiliti ofthe State which committed it varies according to the
nature o/ the act."... This sliding scale of responsibility with respect to
unla\\ ful acts explains why the acts of the United Kingdom, although
unla\\ful, did not rise to the level of condemnation and seriousness
triggered by Albania's omissions.
In addition, it becomes clear that each side in the Corhit Channel Case
\as actingi, in accordance with its o\\n vic\ of the situation, under the
impression that it \as exercising a legitimate right: for Albania, it \was the
right to self-protection and territorial integrity, for the United Kingdom, it
v as the right of free passage through an international strait in time of peace.
For both sides, ho \ever. their actions represented a "misuse of right." '
This limitation on the exercise of rights, as articulated by Judge Alvarez,
provides another lens through which to \ ie\ the case and prevents states
from gaining immunity just because the\ belie\ed they acted within their
rights. The resulting problem, once again, is ho\\ to determine the legal
line between, in this case, the legitimate exercise of a right and the misuse
or abuse of it.
The decision in the Coh/u Channel Case may be compared with
another more recent one involving a finding of state responsibility, namely
the C'asc (oiccrning L ',itcd States Diplomatic and C onsular Staf/in Tehran
(hereinaltcr 'US. Hostatc.s C.%c ").- In that case the ICJ characterized
the initial facts leading up to the hostage taking as follows:
.\t appro\Imaicly 10.30 a.m. on 4 No\ ember 1979, during the course of a
demonstration of approximately 3.000 persons, the United States Embassy
compound in Tehran "as overrun b\ a strong armed group of several
hundred people. The Iranian security personnel are reported to have simply
disappeared from the scene; at all c\ ents it is established that they made
no apparent effort to deter or prevent the demonstrators from seizing the
Embassy's premises."'
223. Ibid.
224 Ibid, (emphasis added)
225 Ihid at 47-4X 'cc Aharc/'s opinion, arguing that "in vurtue of the la%% or social
interdependence this condemnation of the misuse of a right should he transported into international
law" Ihid at 48
226 ( c'G , .n, ir, trin L miicd ,t tc. Diplomatic and Con.'u/a, Staff in Tchran (Uited States 1
Iran). [I 1980] I.C'J Rep. 3 [U.S. IIortas.c! Case].
227. Ibid. at para. 17.
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The facts thus imnediatelv set up a situation, analogous to the ('orlu
Channel ('a., where at l'.t a state may be liable not just for its positive
acts mine laving or hostagc-taking but also for its omissions or fail-
ure to act -f- ailure to notit interested countries of the danger from the
mines or failure to protect the safetx of foreign diplomatic personnel.
It is siognificant that Iran did not appear before the Court in order to
full\ present its case and proffer arguments in support of its position. 2-
Howxexer, the ICJ did examine the initial question of the admissibility of
the United States' claim and Iran's objections thereto contained in its letter
to the Court of 9 December I 79.221 In the manner of Albania's assertions,
the Iranian position centered on its oxx ni somewx hat loosely concei ed
notions of sov-ereigznty:
The Iranian Go emnment in its letter ... drewx attention to \\ hat it referred
to as the 'deep rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic
Rex olution of Iran, a revolution of a \N hole oppressed nation against its
oppressors and their masters'. The examination of the 'numerous
repercussions' of the rexolution. it added, is 'a matter essentially and
directly within the national sovereignt,, of Iran'."'
In the letter, Iran further argued that the ICJ could not exercise jurisdiction
over the matter because -'[the U S hostages] question only represents a
marginal and secondary aspect of an oxerall problem, one such that it
cannot be studied separatel. and which in\ol\es, inter alia, more than 25
years of continual interference bN the United States in the internal affairs
of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes
perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all
international and humanitarian norms.""' According to Iran, therefore, "the
Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper
context, namely the \\hole political dossier of the relations between Iran
and the United States o\ er the last 25 years."2 32 The Court rejected Iran's
claim that the case xxas inadmissible and found that the general reliance on
such historical circumstances without further explanation was not suffi-
cient to divest the Court of jurisdiction.1
228 Ibid. at para. 33
229. Ibid.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid. at para 35.
232. Ibid.
233. Ibid. at para. 37. The court additionall\ addressed Iran's argument based on "more than 25
years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran" by again empha-
sizing that "it was open to Iran to present its owkn case regarding those acti\ ties to the Court by way
of defence to the United States' claims. The Iranian Government, however, did not appear before the
Court." Ibid. at 81
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As to the merits of the case, the Court directly addressed the respon-
sibility of Iran for the attacks on the embassies and subsequent hostage
taking: "[t]he first phase, here under examination, of the events complained
of also includes the attacks on the United States Consulates at Tabriz and
Shiraz. Like the attack on the Embassy, they appear to have been executed
by militants not having an official character, and successful because of
lack of sufficient protection.1234 However, this fact did not absolve Iran of
responsibility. Even though the attacks were not directly imputable to the
actions of the state, this "does not mean that Iran is, in consequence, free
of any responsibility in regard to those attacks; for its own conduct was in
conflict with its international obligations."23 As in the Cotri Channel Case,
the state was found liable for its omissions, i.e., the government's failure
to act to protect the embassies and the diplomatic personnel in contraven-
tion of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963.
Another important part of the discourse on the state responsibility in
the US. Hostages Case concerned the legitimacy and appropriateness of
counter measures taken by the U.S. subsequent to the hostage taking. The
ICJ noted that the United States had acted unilaterally after instituting its
action before the Court and after provisional measures had been ordered.
The United States imposed economic sanctions, froze assets of Iranian
nationals and conducted an abortive military rescue which included invad-
ing Iranian territory. 3' The Court did not condone these acts of "self-
help," but instead "expressed its concern" in the following manner:
Before drawing the appropriate conclusions from its findings on the merits
in this case, the Court considers that it cannot let pass without comment
the incursion into the territory of Iran made by United States military
units .... No doubt the United States Government may have had
understandable preoccupations with respect to the well-being of its
nationals held hostage in its Embassy for over five months. No doubt also
the United States Government may have had understandable feelings of
frustration at Iran's long-continued detention of the hostages,
notwithstanding two resolutions of the Security Council as well as the
Court's own Order of 15 December 1979 calling expressly for their
immediate release. Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present
proceedings, the Court cannot fail to express its concern in regard to the
United States 'incursion into Iran. When, as previously recalled, this case
234. Ibid at para. 61 (emphasis added).
235. Ibid- at para. 61.
236. Ibid.
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had become ready for hearing on 19 February 1980, the United States
Agent requested the Court, owing to the delicate stage of certain
negotiations, to defer setting a date for the hearings. Subsequently, on 11
March, the Agent informed the Court of the United States Government's
anxiety to obtain an early judgment on the merits of the case. The hearings
were accordingly held on 18, 19 and 20 March, and the Court was in
course of preparing the present judgment adjudicating upon the claims of
the United States against Iran when the operation of 24 April 1980 took
place. The Court therefore feels bound to observe that an operation
undertaken in those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind
calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international
relations, and to recall that in paragraph 47, 1 B, of its Order of 15
December 1979 the Court had indicated that no action was to be taken by
either party which might aggravate the tension between the two
'1'countries."
The dissenting opinion of Judge Morozov was even more condemnatory
of the U.S. counter measures and would have denied United States any
reparations: "taking into account the extraordinary circumstances which
occurred during the period of judicial deliberation on the case, when the
Applicant itself committed many actions which caused enormous damage
to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Applicant has forfeited the legal right
as well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for
reparation." 3
The doctrine of state responsibility as expressed in these two cases is
interestingly devoid of bright lines clearly indicating where the right stops
and abuse of the right begins. The majority of the Court in the US.
Hostages case condemned the American counter measures but stopped
short of holding that such actions would preclude reparations for Iranian
breaches. The Court made its condemnation of the United States in the
softest voice possible - by expressing its "concern" and recalling that it
had formerly ordered the parties not to "aggravate the tension." Judge
Morozov attacked the majority's characterization of these counter mea-
sures as well as the depiction of the facts themselves by the majority:
Some parts of the reasoning of the Judgment described the circumstances
of the case in what I find to be an incorrect or one-sided way .... I was
unable to accept paragraphs 32, 93 and 94. The language used by the
237. Ibid. paras. 31-32.
238. Ibid. at para. 93.
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Court in thosc paragraphs does not give a full and correct description of
the actions of the United States A hich took place on the territory of the
Islamic Republic of Iran on 24-25 April 1980. Some of the wording used
by the Court for its description of the events follows uncriticalv the
terminology used in the statement made by the President ofthe United
States on 25 April 1980, in which various attempts were made to justify,
from the point of view of international law, the so-called rescue operation.
But even when the President s statement is quoted, some parts thereof:
which are important.for a torrcct a.svst'cs.wcnt ol those event.%, are omitted.239
This alternative interpretation of the facts and the different ramifications
of the United States' alleged violations of international law shows that
there xw ere no clear a priori legal (although good political) reasons for the
majority to treat the American counter measures as frowned upon yet
tolerable.
This inherent lack of bright line rules in the state responsibility
discourse brings up the quest for substance and codification pursued by
the ILC in its Draft Articles."" These Articles have become highly influen-
tial in spite of the fact that they are provisional only and have not been
agreed by states in a formal treaty. The ICJ has considered "certain aspects
of the Draft Articles as reflecting the customary international law of state
responsibility."' -' Other tribunals, such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, "have likewise considered various
parts of the Draft Articles and ILC's commentary as authoritative expres-
sions of customary lav."'- 2
The Draft Articles begin with the statement that "[e]very internation-
ally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of the
State."" ' Phillip Allott has written that the notion of"state responsibility"
is a "dangerous fiction" which in effect creates more harm than good." H
His first point is that "it consecrates the idea that wrongdoing is the
behaviour of a general category known as 'states' and is not the behaviour
of morally responsible persons." '  His second point is that "if responsi-
239. Ihid at 53, para. 5 (Dissenting op. of Judge Moro/o\ ).
240 International Law Comrniion. I)jru/t .tlc/es on Responsibilit
" 
olStatc. for Internationally
lt,,n, igul ,lct , adopted, 53d Sess . 2683rd Mtg.. 27(1,,I ltg .A C\ 4 L.002 Rev. I (2001) [ILC
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241 Lori F Damrosch et ul, .supra note 4 at 686, citing the Case Con, erning the Gabcikovo-
Vu.itvmaro.% Prolest (Hungai v Smasas) [1997] I.C . Rep. 7 at paras. 4-52,
242 Ibid., citing The Blaskic ( ass (1997), Case No IT-95-14-ARl08bis, (International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugosl a , Appeals Chamber. 2Q Oct. 1997) para. 26 at n.34.
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bility exists as a legal category, it must be given legal substance ...
general conditions of responsibility have to be created which are then
applicable to all rights and duties. The net result is that the deterrent effect
of imposition of responsibility is seriously compromised ... by leaving room
for argument in eNerv conceivable case... At a basic level, AlIott is
concerned with the "nefarious effects" of interposing the concept of
responsibility between wrongdoing and liability.
The first critique is reminiscent of the point made in the context of the
sovereignty and jurisdictional discourses concerning the idiosyncratic and
outmoded conception of the state and its state powers. As discussed, the
reification of the state can result in certain viewpoints being privileged
over others, namely those with nationalistic ties and those allied with
narrowly defined national interests. Alternative discourses get discounted
or left out, especially those based on the interests of transnational groups.
A similar phenomenon occurs in the context of state responsibility. The
result in this context, as Allott makes clear, "is that those human beings
who implement la\\'s rights and duties are able to perceive themselves, on
the one hand, as entitled to implement the state's rights and duties and, on
the other hand, as bringing about responsibility in the state if they imple-
ment them unlawfully."2'- For Allott, "it is not surprising that states
behav e badly" under such circumstances. 2 " In effect, the state acts as a
shield (and sword) for individuals to hide (or fight) behind: "The moral
effect of the law is vastly reduced if the human agents involved are able to
separate themselves personally from the duties the la\w imposes and from
the responsibility which it entails.""-'
With respect to the second critique, Allott focuses on the Articles
concerning "Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness," which by defin-
ing the limits of responsibility also thereby provide copious arguments to
states and their lawyers to justify otherwise unlawful behaviour. These
Articles define six circumstances precluding wrongfulness: "consent,
countermeasures in respect to an internationally wrongful act, force
majeure and fortuitous event, distress, state of necessity, and self-
defense.' 502" Allott identifies the self-defense exception and its close
relation - counter measures - as akin to "self-help". He takes a hard
stance with respect to self-help, commenting that it is "indistinguishable




250. Ibid. at 17.
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frorn anarchy in practice if it is regarded by the subjects of the law as the
normal sanction of the law."2"
Allott's view of the concept of state responsibility concept sees through
it to something hidden, and even pernicious, beneath its surface. His evalu-
ation of state responsibility is important because it forces one to question
the perceived wisdom and structure of the doctrine. Out of the three
discourses explored in the present article, state responsibility superficially
appears to be the most helpful in protecting the state and preserving inter-
national society. However, that a doctrine which professes to "impose
responsibility" on rogue nations could also simultaneously, and perhaps in
a greater number of instances, function to do the opposite - that is to
allow\ states to escape responsibility is an apparent paradox and an utter
chimera for international law and the international lawyer. Allott's
perspective also recognizes the dangers surrounding the bureaucratization
of international law and society, which, in a Weberian sense, "involves not
only the dominance of a certain social group but also the dominance of a
certain mentality."'-
From a sociological perspective, bureaucratization "is no longer
precisely the spirit of autocracy and oppression characteristic of old
regimes." '253 Rather, it is an attitude which "seeks to get the job done with
the minimum of spiritual commitment and the maximum of personal secu-
rity." ' For Allott, this spirit is especially sympathetic to the state because
it sustains the state structure, and is particularly detrimental to - what for
Allott is the proper focus and concern of international law - the people
who exist within the state. Allott has a particular perspective (and some
may say bias) that envisions the role of the international lawyer as serving
not just governments but "international society" as a whole: for him, "as
lawyers they are servants not of power but of justice. '"26 5
This utopian view is one which imbues law with special, almost super-
natural, powers as the overseer and restrainer of state power. Law
functions ideally for Allott as a great mediator, allowing the relationship
betxween the people and the state to be one of growth, prosperity and
stewardship, not subjugation. At the same time, law's articulations, espe-
cially as manifested in the work of the ILC, its codifiers and bureaucrats,
tend to devalue and erode the very legitimacy of law itself. The view of
25I Ibid at21.
252 Ibid at 9.
253. Ibid. at 10
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid. at 24.
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law as a great social phenomenon, with its promise for humankind's well
being and happiness, is life affirming and positive. As Allott points out,
though, this is a view which is vet to be realized, because international law
is trapped to varying degrees, as argued in this article, in the pre-revolu-
tionary and antiquated discourses of previous centuries."'
II. Examining The Structure Qf Fairness Discourse And Its Presuppositions
The central concern of Part I of the article was the influence of bias in the
discourses of contemporary international law, specifically those about
sovereignty, jurisdiction and state responsibility. These discourses were
singled out, both for their representative capacity to highlight certain trends
running like threads through the fabric of international law and for their
interconnectedness and interdependence. Now in Part II it is time to
examine the discourse surrounding fairness. The concept of fairness has
become a vehicle that, for its proponents at least, enables the transplanta-
tion of western. liberal values to other parts of the world. It also does so,
according to its adherents, in a way that allows those values to be legiti-
mated, i.e., it avoids the imperialism critique, it conquers charges of ethno-
and culture-centrism, and, most importantly for present purposes, it
defeats the challenge of bias launched by those who reject the universalist
stance.
Thomas Franck has analyzed the notion of fairness and finds it the
most important basis for the creation of modem international legal norms.257
For Franck, international law has reached a new level of maturity and
complexity.258 It is now in its post-ontological stage, meaning that the
question "whether international laNN is law" no longer needs to be asked,
proved, defended, or fought over; rather, the issue of importance is the
content of the new international law.259 Thus new questions must be asked,
such as "Is international law effective? Is it enforceable? Is it understood?
and, most importantly, Is international law fair?""" Fairness, therefore,
has become the meta-discourse, which rises above and preserves the other
internal discourses, providing legitimacy, acceptance, and stability to the
system of international law.
256. Ibid at 25.
257. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
258. Ibid. at 4-6.
259. See ibid. at 3-9.
260. Ibid at 9.
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The importance of fairness to international law's self-conscious justi-
fication cannot be overstated. If it is fair to impose our cultural values
universally throughout the world, then what basis do recipient societies
have to object'? Fairness may seem like a way out of the paradox of univer-
salism, but it is necessary first to determine on what it is based. At bottom,
if the fairness discourse fails to provide justifications for the transplanta-
tion of legal xalues, or if the presuppositions of fairness are unsatisfactory,
then better ways must be sought to resolve the critique of cultural
imperialism.
Franck identifies two presuppositions of modern fairness discourse:
moderate scarcity and community.2" ' The condition of moderate scarcity,
as Franck says, citing Rawls, presents an optimal opportunity for fairness
discourse to be productive: "it is most likely to be productive when the
allocation of rights and duties occurs in circumstances which make alloca-
tion both necessary and possible." ' 2 The implication is that productive
discourse must convince others (i.e., the less fortunate) of the distribu-
tional justness of their assigned allocations. Compare the state responsi-
bility discourse which was most likely to be productive, effective or
efficient in situations where the most powerful had been wronged and
needed a remedy against a less poxerful adversary, even in spite ojthe
technical wrongs committed by the more powverful, as the Corfu Channel
and US. Hostages cases exemplify. In other words, fairness discourse would
not be productive if it failed to pacify and assuage the discontent felt by
those less well off.
With respect to the second precondition of fairness, Franck supposes a
community "based, first, on a common, conscious system of reciprocity
betwveen its constituents... "'213 The community, Franck emphasizes, is
not just about shared rights and rules, but also about "shared moral
imperatives and values."" 4 This point echoes Slaughter's distinction raised
in Part I between liberal and non-liberal states, where the so called
"liberal" states constitute the community. When one considers who
defines liberal and who defines the community, it becomes painfully obvi-
ous how tautological and circular is the use of these terms. We define who
is able to join the community and who gets excluded, so it is no wonder
that "fairness" can thrive in this limited context.
Concern over the exclusivity and bias in this reference to the commu-
261 Ibid
262. Ibid at 10.
263. Ibid at 10.
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nity of states may be countered, as Franck does, by stressing the global
nature of contemporary relations. For example, he says:
As we enter the third millennium, there is much evidence of a global
communitN. emerging out of a gro\\ing awareness of irrefutable inter-
dependence, its imperatix es and exigencies. It may be tempting to speak
of emerging "globl communities': of trade, of environmental concerns,
of securitv. of health measures, etcetera. It would, hoxxever, be inaccurate
because the regimes are linked. A state's conformity with environmental
policy will hax e an effect on its credit-worthiness in borro\ing from the
\World Bank: most favored nation trade benefits may be linked to a state's
human rights record, and so forth. 'These multiple linkages, making
different regimes interdependent. are ex idence of community. 2'6
The trend of globalization certainly points toward increasing interaction
between states and a larger and larger encompassing community. But the
process is not complete yet. There are many states and people living within
states which do not share a sense that they belong in any real sense to a
global community.
But what does it matter if a few rogue nations do not (or do not choose)
to participate in a larger community of states'? May not they be left alone
or forced to comply if they do not feel the voluntary obligations of the
"liberal" states'?" Indeed, some sort of disagreement is an inevitable part
of the fairness discourse. As Franck acknowledges:
Even if 'exerxone' were to agree. at least in theory, that fairness is a
necessary condition of allocational rules, this unfortunately would not
assure that everyone shared the same sense of fairness or agreed on a
fixed meaning. Fairness is not 'out there' waiting to be discovered, it is
a product of social context and history.... What is considered allocationally
fair has varied across time, and still varies across cultures.
What this tells us, however. can be easily misrepresented. It does not tell
us that the search for allocational fairness is the pursuit of a chimera.
What the deep contextuality of all notions of fairness does tell us is that
fairness is relative and subjectixe ... a human, subjective, contingent
quality which merely captures in one word a process, reasoning, and a
negotiation leading, if successful, on an agreed formula....
265. Ibid. at 12.
266. See Fernando R. TesUn, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, Co.: W csitew Press,
1998) c. 2.
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What this quotation also shows is that Franck is well aware of the subjec-
tive and viewpoint laden nature of the fairness discourse. Any one concep-
tion of fairness ma' ' (paradoxically) be biased from someone else's
perspective. To be fair likely seems unfair to someone, some of the time.
One person's freedom fighter may he another's terrorist. One person's
liberation is to another subjugation. One person's sacred values are another's
outlawed taboos.
Given the admittedly subjective nature of fairness, the question still
remains, what to do with rogue or non-compliant nations? One way the
fairness discourse deals with this question is by subdividing fairness, so
that it can function on different levels for different parties simultaneously.
This subdivision is encapsulated in what Franck calls his "caveat" to the
fairness discourse." ' It distinguishes between "legitimacy as process
fairness" and "distributive justice as moral fairness."27 ° The important
point here is that these conceptions can, and do, conflict, although there is
much overlap between legitimacy and justice. Just as sovereignty
concerns state sovereignty and people's sovereignty, so fairness may
express legitimacy and justice. Both are viable options in the discourse.
As Franck says:
The notion of fairness encompasses two different and potentially adversary
components: legitimacy and distributive justice. These components are
indicators of law's, and especiallyfair law's, primary objective: to achieve
a negotiated balance between the need for order and the need for change.
... What matters is how this tension is managed discursively through what
Koskenniemi calls 'the social conception' of the legal system. This 'social
conception' manifests itself in the discursive pursuit of fairness.271
Thus, for example, there were fairness arguments made on both sides of
the United States's intervention in 1990 against Iraq after it had invaded
Kuwait. Supporters of the United States asserted legitimacy-as-fairness in
arguing that concepts such as uti possidetis and territorial integrity gave
legitimacy to Kuwait's claim of sovereignty, free from invasion..272 The
26X. "May" is more exact than "is" because it is logically possible to have a universally fair rule,
i.e., in theory, there is a possible state of affairs where a rule could be devised which everyone would
be convinced produced a fair result. For example, if our entire community consisted of a small
group of people, or perhaps a large group with homogenous interests, and no other people in the
univcrs were in existence, then a rule could be devised that everyone would consider fair.
269. Franck, supra note 257.
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other side urged justice-as-fairness in maintaining there was a grossly
unjust resource allocation between the peoples of Kuwait and Iraq, who
had been artificially divided by colonial intervention. 73
This nuanced approach captures some of the depth and flexibility of
the fairness discourse and goes a long way to meeting the claim that
"fairness" does not take into account alternative views and cultures. But
the charge of ethnocentrism is still not answered, because one can imagine
a situation where both "legitimacy-as-fairness" and "justice-as-fairness"
operated in tandem and synchronously within one community, but not
between different communities. An example might be specific family law
or divorce rules operating in different cultures. In one culture they may be
viewed as completely legitimate and distributionally just, but considered
in another as sexist, unfair, and degrading to women.
John Tasioulas has written a paper directly critiquing Franck's discus-
sion of fairness." Tasioulas criticizes Franck for, among other things, his
failure to deal adequately with the problem of ethnocentrism.275 Tasioulas
acknowledges that Franck does not accept the objectivist basis of fairness,
but instead, as we have seen, embraces an inter-subjective and flexible
conception.276 In order to highlight the importance of culture and the
imperialist dilemma that is not rectified merely because of one community's
inter-subjective conception of fairness, Tasioulas relies on the work of
Italian political philosopher Daniel Zolo.2" Zolo attacks the liberal enter-
prise of universalism by first asserting "the incompatibility of the values
expressed in human rights norms with 'the dominant ethos in countries
like ... China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan or Nigeria.' Second, he
insists that the lack of objective foundations for such norms renders their
invocation 'a perfect continuation of the missionary, colonizing tradition
of the Western powers.' 276
Tasioulas suggests that "nothing in [Fairness in International Law and
Institutions] ... really dispels the threat of ethnocentrism." '279 He does,
however, acknowledge that elsewhere Franck argues that "personal free-
dom is not a parochial, specifically Western value and hence not an ethno-
273. Ibid-
274. John Tasioulas, "International Law and the Limits of Fairness" (2002) 13 E.J..L. 993.
275. Ibid. at 995, et seq.
276. Ibid. at 997-998.
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centric imposilion on non-Western cultures. " '- As Franck says in that other
context:
There is no reason to believe that these underlying emancipatory forces
[e.g., de\cloprnents in industrialization, urbanization, scientific and
technological discovcries, transportation, communication, information
processing and education] ... are indigenous to Western socictN and cannot
affect other societies as they have affected our own. On the contrary, one
must assume them io be independent variables. which, when they come
to the fore anN where under the right conjunction of circumstances, can
tilt the balance in favor of more personal autonomy. 2"
In addition, Franck docs have another argument which speaks to the
non-parochial character of liberal values and ideas. This occurs in his
discussion of demnocracy, as Tasioulas notes:
This almost complete triumph of ... notions of democracy (in Latin
America, Africa. Eastern I urope. and to a lesser extent Asia) may wkell
pro\c to be the most profound e\ent of the twentieth century, and will in
all likelihood create the fulcrum on x\hich future development of global
society sN ill turn. It is the unanswerable response to claims that free, open,
multiparty
. 
electoral parliamentar_ democracy is neither desired nor
desirable outside a small enclave of \\estern industrial states. '
For Tasioulas, these arguments are a -'valuable corrective to the tendency
to reil\' cultures and ascribe to them an historically in\ariant essence. "' - ..
Despite the attractiveness of the "independent variable" argument and
the "'empirical democracy" claim, this still does not adequately answer
ll hr certain states are left out of the community of states, or why some
cultures are privileged o\cr others, nor does it provide a normative
explanation for the universal nature of liberal values. As Tasioulas notes,
"it is unlikely that such empirical considerations, pertaining to modernity
... can blunt the real force of the ethnocentric challenge." ' Indeed, while
it pro\ ides a sociological or descriptiv\e explanation for the fact of the
permeation of liberal values throughout the world, it does little to explain
2i0 Ibid,
2X). Ihid at 10101, referring to Thomas NI Franck. -I Personal Freedom a \\estern Value?" (1997)
91 Am. J. In'l L 593. substaniially reprinted as chapter 6 ofT. Franck, The Enpowcred Self Law
and ,mwl i the Iig' of Individual n (New 'i ork: Oxford Unn eritl Press. 1999).
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wh\, these values shouh predominate.
Tasioulas is surel\ right to be skeptical of Franck's utopian vision of
the fairness discourse as really having all the justificatory and explanatory
power \\hich it is advertised to have. But, at the same time, Franck is
correct in pointing out that there is no objectlve standard of fairness \x ith
which to assuage the rumblings of "'the natives" and the malcontents.
Fairness discourse suffers from the kind of blind adherence which
\\ ittgenstein discussed in On C'-rtaintv, from which Tasioulas aptly quotes:
'[m]en have judged that a king can make rain, wc say this contradicts all
experience. Today the\ judge that aeroplanes and the radio etc. are means
for the closer contact of peoples and the spread of culture." ' This state-
ment is made in connection with \Vittgenstein's general discussion of how
\%e come to know or belie\ e things about the \\orld, \\hich is helpful in
making an assessment of the fairness discourse.
One of \Vittgenstein's main points in On CcrtaintY is that it is a fallacy
to think that incremental cxpi.wnicc in individual cases teaches us how to
jiude the world. For Vittgenstein. 'experience is not the ground for our
game of judgin. Nor is it its outstanding success." "" This should not be
confused .\ ith an objectivist stance. Wittgenstein is not saying, like Kant,
that judging is dependent on a priori structures common to all mankind
through Reason. Instead. \\ ittgenstein has in mind an inter-subjectixist
idea, that is an organically arising structure of propositions which are
mutually dependent and reinforcing. This idea is elucidated by
Vittgenstein's further txo insights that "[xx ]hen we first begin to believe
anything, what xxe belie\ e is not a single proposition, it is a \x hole system
of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole. )-' and that "[w]e
do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules:
we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A
totality of judgments is made plausible to us." ' For Vsittgenstein, -[i]t is
not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which conse-
quences and premises gixe one another mutual support.""'
These insights help to understand both the limitations and the power of
fairness discourse. Fairness is a language game which we all play in the
Western liberal world. It has been learned and has come to be seen as the
285. Ibid. at 1003, citing Ludwig \, itgentcin, On Certainty. ed. by G.E.\i Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright, trans. By D. Paul & (G.E.M. Anscombe \cx, York: Harper, 1969) at para. 132.
286. Wittgenstein, On CertaintY, ibid. at para. 131.
287. Ibid. at para. 141.
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primary mode upon which we judge other propositions, arrangements and
institutions, as well as the extraterritorial application and transplantation
of our laws on other nations and peoples. But Wittgenstein reminds us that
fairness, like any other judgment, is only one element in a web of inter-
connecting ideas which hang together in a certain conceptual structure.
The strength of the fairness discourse derives not from its individual right-
ness or wrongness but rather from its co-existence and interdependence
with other concepts in the Western liberal vocabulary, for example, legiti-
macy, equity, freedom, and justice. Each of these terms gains credibility
and is partially defined by reference to fairness, and vice-a-versa.
In Culture and Value, another postumously published collection of
writings of Wittgenstein, he remarks that -[n]othing we do can be defended
absolutely and finally. But only by reference to something else that is not
questioned. I.e. no reason could be given why you should act (or should
have acted) like this, except that by doing so you bring about such and
such a situation, which again has to be an aim which you accept."29 ° This
thought is another way of making the point that eventually justification
and explanation must stop because, at the last, there is no further reason
for our actions which can be articulated, given the confines of our
language and our way of seeing the world. The Iraq/Kuwait crisis of 1990
comes to mind again. As Franck commented 29' there was no absolute and
final justification for American intervention just as there was no absolute
and final justification for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the end, each side
acted on principles that were ultimately justified, not by further concepts,
but by the achievement of a new situation, the legitimacy of which the
majority of the rest of the world by consensus would either accept
or reject.
In one sense, Wittgenstein's insight regarding certainty does not
resolve the charge of ethnocentrism raised against fairness discourse. In
fact, it actually strengthens this charge by acknowledging that concepts
derive their meaning from the socially accepted complex of interconnect-
ing principles which are learned as part of one's language, culture,
upbringing and development as a member of a particular society. But, in
another wider and surely more important sense, Wittgenstein's philosophy
provides a solution to the charge by acknowledging that the notion of
certainty is a function of an inter-subjective commitment reached by
persons operating as part of a functioning community. Because each
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system or each culture operates within its own conceptual structures and
language, it is true that no one system has any a priori claim of primacy.
But it is also true that in the real world a state of affairs already exists, and
continues to grow, from which is emerging a new community whose
values will gain priority because of globalization and the sheer number of
its participants.
Indeed, the problems and blessings of globalization impel us to oper-
ate as a mixed society of states, transnational groups, peoples, individuals
and other entities. We have no choice if we are to survive as a species on
this planet. It is hard not to agree with Phillip Allott's view that "law forms
part of the self-constituting of a society" and that "law is a universalizing
system, reconceiving the infinite particularity of human willing and
acting, in the light of the common interest of society."'2 2 From the abstract
heights of Allott's almost Hegelian project of law realizing itself comes
the recognition that there may not be any ethical justification for cultural
imperialism which can be articulated outside our own idiosyncratic
cultural context. However, that fact, although it may be hard to accept,
does not require abandonment of the project of international society and
international law. Instead, it requires that we accept a commitment to take
a hard look at our biases and assumptions.
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